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Workplace wellness programs (WWPs) target enhancing employees’ physical and 
mental well-being and provide potential health and economic benefits to workplaces. 
Workplaces have increasingly been adopting WWPs due to these perceived benefits. 
National and international policies have encouraged the use of WWPs to promote public 
health. The broad awareness and applications of WWPs require us to ask if and how we 
should evaluate their performance. Despite the pervasiveness, there have been 
disagreements on health improvements and potential financial savings of WWPs. The 
debate results from the difficulty to analyze these programs. Program design, program 
participation, measurement strategies, and statistical analyses are the main fundamental 
challenges that cause the difficulties. Many studies have discussed these challenges but 
have not proposed sufficient rigorous evaluation to validate the findings. This research 
advances the literature by characterizing the inherent methodological challenges in WWP 
evaluations, by finding solutions to some of these challenges, and by validating WWPs 
effectiveness with more comprehensive approaches. This dissertation fill the need for a 
rigorous evaluation by (1) evaluating the relationship between the methodological quality 
of studies and findings on returns of WWPs, (2) exploring reasons for adoption of WWPs 
and analyzing the assumption that financial savings drive the adoption of WWPs, and (3) 
estimating return on investment (ROI) of a WWP for a small nonprofit organization as 
well as evaluating the WWP outcomes with a more comprehensive approach. 
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Chronic diseases have become the leading cause of disability and death, 
accounting for 60 percent of the deaths worldwide (Bloom et al., 2011). Global economic 
burden of major non-communicable chronic diseases was estimated $5.8 trillion for 2010 
and projected $8.2 trillion for 2030 by the World Economic Forum. A report from Milken 
Institute showed that the total cost of chronic diseases in the U.S. health care system was 
$3.7 trillion in 2016 (Waters and Graf, 2018). The high prevalence and costs of chronic 
illnesses, such as heart disease, stroke, high blood pressure, diabetes, and obesity, show 
the importance of preventing diseases and promoting health, as well as treating diseases 
(WHO, 2005; Chénier. et al. 2012; Guazzi et al., 2013; Mattke et al., 2013; Edington et 
al., 2014; Benjamin, 2016; National Center for Health Statistics, 2016). 
Workplace wellness programs (WWPs), which are employer-sponsored programs 
to promote health-related behaviors of employees, have become common intervention 
tools to address the rising prevalence and costs of chronic conditions, and advocate public 
health (Mattke et al., 2013). WWPs have widely recognized to prevent the spread of 
chronic diseases not only in Western societies, such as United States and Western 
Europe, but also in many other countries which are WHO members (Burton, 2010). 
Worksites are ideal places to reach out to a large portion of the population for health 
interventions (Cohen, 1985; Anderko et al.; 2012; Rongen et al., 2013). Work- related 
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factors, such as work environment and social relationships, impact individuals’ ability to 
adopt healthy lifestyles (WHO, 2002). 
Interventions such as WWPs is not a new notion. Public and private sectors have 
used workplace interventions as policy tools to improve employee health and 
productivity for decades (De Greef and Van den Broek, 2004; Spence, 2015). However, 
the concepts of health and wellness have evolved over time. The earliest interventions 
focused on worker productivity changes and improved working conditions, such as 
lighting, working hours, and rest breaks (Hawthorne effect). These efforts go back to the 
1920s and 1930s (Jones, 1992). While those interventions may have had an indirect 
influence on the health of employees, the first intentional health-related programs to be 
implementing in workplaces was Employee assistance programs (EAPs). EAPs started as 
occupational alcoholism interventions that impacted worker productivity and can be 
traced back to the early 1940s in Western industrialized countries (Walsh, 1982). 
The increasing prevalence and costs of chronic diseases initiated the health 
promotion and prevention (HPP) programs for employees starting in the 1970s (Cohen, 
1985). Targeting individual risk factors using HPP programs was a response to increased 
health care costs due to chronic illnesses in the U.S. and increased illness- related 
productivity losses in Western Europe (Cordia et al., 2000; De Greef and Van den Broek, 
2004). In the 1980s, employee wellness programs focused more on changing health 
behaviors and attitudes towards nutrition, weight management, alcohol and tobacco use, 
physical activity, and stress management (Cordia et al., 2000; Khoury, 2014). 
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The wellness perception of policy-makers has evolved from passive protection at 
early stages of occupational safety to now being recognized as an essential element of 
health development (Declaration, 1997). The wellness concept has started incorporating 
social and environmental components as well as behavioral changes since the late 1990s. 
Enhancing overall employee health beyond conventional occupational health and safety 
notions has become important for public health concerns. Today, WWPs are combined 
with occupational health and safety to enhance public health (WHO, 1997; Cordia et al., 
2000; Warr, 2012). 
WWPs have been popular and supported by international organizations and 
governments, especially starting in the late 1990s. The European Network for Workplace 
Health Promotion (ENWHP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) are the two 
most active institutions that support WWPs at the international level. The ENWHP is a 
network that assists organizations’ corporate strategy to improve employee health and 
reduce the impact of work-related health issues (Guazzi et al., 2013). The World Health 
Organization (WHO) considers WWPs as the joint efforts of stakeholders and involves 
governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to promote health 
using workplace wellness (Declaration, 1997). In 2007, the WHO supported the Global 
Plan of Action (GPA) on workers’ health, which examined the issue from a public health 
perspective, for the period of 2008-2017 (Burton, 2010). 
The Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), which is the largest national 
commitment to invest in wellness, is the U.S. government’s strategy to use WWPs as a 
part of overall national health care policy (Anderko et al., 2012; Mattke et al., 2013).The 
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ACA provided technical assistance in terms of evaluating the effectiveness of WWPs and 
grants to small businesses in promoting health and preventing diseases. Prior to the ACA, 
the National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety (NIOSH) introduced the Total 
Worker Health (THW) program in 2003 as a commitment to protect and promote 
workers’ health in the U.S. (Schill and Chosewood, 2013). The program established six 
broad priorities for the future research for WWPs: assessing intervention efficacy; 
focusing on population, job, and worksite characteristics; using proper study design 
(going beyond the reliance on randomized clinical trials); applying proper measures and 
metrics; studying sustainability and knowledge; and addressing global concerns (NIOSH, 
2012). 
Both the popularity and the amount of funds invested in these programs require 
researchers to establish these program’s benefits to justify the use of WWPs as robust 
policy tools in public health. Evidence from the literature suggests that WWPs improve 
employee health by reducing modifiable risk factors, such as physical inactivity, tobacco 
use, unhealthy eating habits, obesity, high blood pressure, high blood glucose, and high 
cholesterol that could all cause chronic diseases (Meenan et al., 2010; Nyman et al., 
2012; Goetzel et al., 2014; Dement et al., 2015; Newman et al., 2015). WWPs impact 
employee performance and turnover as well as employee health. Many studies have 
suggested that health improvements through WWPs increase health- related productivity 
by reducing absenteeism (absence from work due to sickness) and presenteeism (present 
at work but reduced productivity due to sickness) (Baker et al., 2008; Goetzel and 
Osminowzki, 2008; Trogdon, Reyes, and Dietz, 2009; Meenan et al., 2010; Yen et al., 
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2010; Nyman et al., 2012; Goetzel et al., 2014). Previous research has mostly focused on 
the return on investment (ROI) of WWPs and suggested that companies that invest in 
WWPs could take advantage of financial savings (Cohen, 1985; Baicker, Cutler, and 
Song, 2010). Improvements in employee well-being and performance could decrease the 
organizational costs associated with health care utilization, high turnover, and health-
related productivity losses (Goetzel and Ozminowski, 2008; Baicker et al., 2010; Henke 
et al., 2011; Goetzel et al., 2012; Nyman et al., 2012; Goetzel et al., 2014; Musich et al., 
2014; Dement et al., 2015; Musich et al., 2015; Newman et al., 2015). 
Purpose of the Study 
The economic evaluation literature of WWPs still suffers from a lack of rigorous 
findings of program impacts (Hunnicutt and Leffelman, 2007; Lewis et al. 2014). Most of 
the prior studies have indicated the same limitations over the past three decades yet have 
not offered any effective methods to solve the issues. This lack of solutions results in 
little reliable evidence on effectiveness of WWPs that support employee-wellness related 
policies from the perspectives of employers and social policy-makers (Horwitz et al., 
2013; Barbosa et al., 2015). The goal of this dissertation is to offer novel perspectives on 
how to improve the successful adoption and assessment of wellness programs in 
workplaces. The findings of this research assist both employers deciding on provisions of 
WWPs, as well as policy-makers supporting workplace wellness as a tool to promote 
public health. 
This research advances the literature by characterizing the inherent challenges in 
WWP evaluations, by finding solutions to some of these challenges, and by validating 
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WWPs effectiveness with more comprehensive approaches. This dissertation fills the 
need for rigorous evaluations by providing three essays. The first essay, presented in 
Chapter II, is to understand the current state of workplace wellness. The findings 
establish the need to extend evaluation content beyond positive ROI and large for-profit 
companies. The second essay, presented in Chapter III, analyzes the assumption that 
financial savings drive the adoption of WWPs. This goal requires documenting to what 
extent ROI explains WWP adoption. The third essay, presented in Chapter IV, is 
designed to address issues raised in Chapter II by providing an evaluation of a WWP in a 
small nonprofit organization, chosen because where the literature fails to support the 
importance of WWPs is in organizations other than large and for-profit companies. 
Chapter IV addresses issues raised in Chapter III by examining the choice of WWP type 
along with the organization’s goals and adoption reason for WWP. 
Significance 
This research provides several significant contributions to the field. First, Chapter 
II contributes to the field by identifying the common issues in WWP evaluations. This 
chapter offers solutions to the issues that can be fixed, such as needs for rigorous 
evaluations on small companies, statistical inference information, better reporting quality 
of studies, and independent evaluations. 
Second, Chapter III contributes to the field by identifying the missing alignment 
in organizational values with WWP choices and WWP evaluation metrics. This is the 
first study that uses economic theory to model firm behavior when implementing and 
evaluating WWPs. An employer should choose a WWP where the chosen program has 
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the lowest opportunity cost in terms of achieving the company objectives. To measure the 
success given the cost, programs need to be evaluated based on the objectives for 
implementing. If an employer decides on implementing WWPs to receive positive 
returns, ROI should be the evaluation metric. If an employer decides on implementing 
WWPs to reduce number of injuries, ROI should not be the preferred metric. Currently, 
there is no theoretical or empirical studies on organizations’ decision-making processes 
when implementing WWPs and WWP evaluation method that match with the 
organizations’ objectives. 
Third, Chapter IV contributes to the field by providing a rigorous example on a 
WWP evaluation. Chapter IV sets an example on aligning the company objectives for 
WWP implementation and evaluated outcomes as well as improve reporting quality for 
reliable evidence. WWPs are proposed as a strategy to improve employee well-being. 
However, there is not enough compelling evidence from observational studies. This 
chapter fills this gap by providing methods for evaluating a WWP for a small and 
nonprofit organization that potentially advances the use of the programs beyond large and 
for-profit organizations. Fourth, conflicts of interest in current WWP evaluations is a 
major issue. This study fills the need for independent research in the field and examines 
the investment decisions in WWPs from an objective and impartial perspective. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II 
systematically reviews the economic evaluations of WWPs. This chapter examines the 
methodological quality of existing studies on the ROI of workplace wellness programs to 
identify limitations of existing studies. Chapter III examines whether positive ROI can 
 8 
explain the reason for implementing WWPs. This chapter analyzes employers’ reasons 
for WWP adoption to offer proper WWP components and evaluation methods. Chapter 
IV provides an evaluation for ROI of a wellness program in a long-term care company. 
This chapter presents a strategy for estimating the ROI of a workplace wellness program 
using a rigorous method. Chapter V concludes the dissertation with key findings, 
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An extensive empirical body of literature suggests that workplace wellness 
programs (WWPs) improve employee health and work performance (Goetzel and 
Ozminowzki, 2008; Trogdon, Reyes, and Dietz, 2009; Meenan et al., 2010; Henke et al., 
2011; Goetzel et al., 2014; Newman et al., 2015). The economic evaluation literature of 
WWPs has mainly focused on the employer’s perspective. Therefore, cost-savings and 
return on investment (ROI) from health and performance improvements have been the 
focus of much of this literature (Baker et al., 2008; Yen et al., 2010; Nyman et al., 2012; 
Musich et al., 2014; Dement et al., 2015). Based on this literature, many agencies, such as 
the US government and the European Network for Workplace Health Promotion, 
advocate for the widespread adoption of WWPs, particularly for the purpose of reducing 
health care costs and productivity losses. 
Over the past decade, however, new criticism of this literature argues that the 
expected cost savings may not materialize (Lewis and Khanna, 2013, 2014). In particular, 
recent commentators assert that the literature suffers from a lack of rigorous evaluation. 
There is not enough reliable evidence on WWP effectiveness, in terms of delivering cost-
savings or positive ROI, to support policies promoting the adoption of WWPs. In this 
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study, we present a systematic review of WWP ROI studies to both assess the evidence 
supporting WWP policy efforts and to identify the common methodological challenges in 
this literature. 
Because a prior review suggested that studies with greater methodological rigor 
yield lower ROI estimates (Baxter et al., 2014), a primary goal of this systematic review 
is to determine if higher methodological quality is associated with lower ROI estimates 
for WWPs. To accomplish this goal, we used a broader quality index that contains 
measures relevant to common methodological limitations noted in criticism of the WWP 
economic evaluation literature. A lack of randomization is one such issue that decreases 
the study rigor. In general, the nature of WWP participation is nonrandom where 
employees voluntarily participate, such as when voluntary nature has been ensured by 
regulations such as the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA). Another common criticism is the lack of proper statistical methods to estimate 
costs, savings, and ROI. Lastly, potential conflict of interest is also a common criticism. 
Conflicts of interest could arise due to two main reasons: the WWP provider and the 
evaluator are the same or the evaluator has a financial interest in the WWP. 
Beyond methodological rigor, we also explore other potential limitations of the 
literature that are less commonly noted. First, the literature does not use a common 
definition of ROI, leading to inaccurate information on returns being positive and 
limiting the validity of comparisons across studies. Second, statistical inference 
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information for ROI, such as confidence intervals and standard errors, is often absent 
such that formal meta-analyses cannot be performed. Third, large companies are 
overrepresented in the literature and other organizational characteristics such as country, 
industry, objectives for WWP adoption, and WWP provider are important elements that 
could impact the outcomes yet are reported inconsistently in the literature. Fourth, WWPs 
do not have a standard definition, which means that a disease management component is 
occasionally included, or prevention programs are labeled as wellness. Disease 
management and wellness target different outcomes, thus the content has different impact 
on ROI. 
This systematic review provides insights into the main challenges inherent in the 
economic evaluation literature. Some of these issues cannot be solved due to legal or 
practical issues, such as providing more randomized studies and collecting certain 
individual data. However, research can offer analysis methods that could improve the 
study rigor that could better support meta-analyses. Furthermore, we confirm that large 
companies that adopt WWPs specifically in search of cost savings are heavily represented 
in the peer-reviewed literature of economic evaluations of WWPs. The literature needs to 
extend evaluations beyond positive ROI and large organizations to reflect more diverse 
employers’ motivation for adopting WWPs correctly and have impact on decision-
making process more effectively. 
Methods 
This systematic review was conducted using a predetermined protocol based on 
the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) 
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guidelines. We identified peer reviewed articles in PubMed, EconLit, Proquest Central, 
and Scopus. The initial search was conducted on June 4, 2017 and the last search was 
conducted on December 7, 2017. The search resulted in 78 potential articles from which 
33 met eligibility criteria. In addition, we included 11 articles that were pulled from 
reference lists in articles found in the search. 
The search parameters are listed below. The target population was one of the 
following: workplace, employee, worksite, or worker. The target intervention was 
wellness, health, health promotion, health prevention, or wellbeing. The target evaluation 
was economic evaluation including cost benefit, cost effectiveness, cost analysis, 
economic evaluation, economic analysis, or economic assessments. The outcome was 
return on investment. Table 2.1 presents a detailed list of the search terms for each 
database. We did not limit the year of publication. However, we excluded publications 
that were not an independent study (e.g., a review, simulation, or meta-analysis) and not 
in English. We also did not limit the search to specific diseases to include workplace 
wellness, health promotion and disease management programs. We initially reviewed the 
articles based on the title and abstract. The next step was sifting through the articles to 
verify that the included articles were relevant for a full text review. After the full-text 
review, we scanned the reference lists of all identified publications, including those from 
systematic reviews, meta-analyses, and other reviews to identify relevant citations. 
Eligibility Criteria and Study Selection 
The inclusion criteria in the title and abstract review step were determined using 
the search categories presented in table 2.1. The objective was to use the least amount of 
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restrictions to get a broad range of articles that presented an economic assessment of 
WWPs. We excluded articles that did not target employees or workplaces. We excluded 
articles that did not evaluate health or wellness programs. We also excluded articles that 
were related only to work process and not related to health behavior, such as occupational 
safety and health (OSH), ergonomics, and employee assistance programs. 
In the full-text sift, we imposed the same restrictions on target population, 
intervention, and outcome analysis as in the title and abstract sift. In addition, we 
excluded articles that evaluated government-sponsored WWPs to maintain the focus on 
employer-relevant information. Because this review focused on economic outcomes, we 
excluded studies that did not conduct an economic analysis. Only peer-reviewed articles 
were included to analyze the validity of recent critiques of WWP ROI studies (Lewis and 
Khanna, 2013, 2014; Lewis, Khanna, and Montrose, 2014). 
Return on Investment 
ROI is the primary economic outcome of interest for this systematic review. 
There are two ways ROI findings were extracted from the selected articles. The first is 
the ROI estimate as reported, regardless of how it was measured. Reported ROI measures 
include true ROI, expressed either as a ratio or a percentage and measured as the ratio of 
net benefit (the difference between benefits and program costs) to program cost, which 
has a threshold for positive ROI of zero (Phillips and Phillips, 2007); the benefit to cost 
ratio, which has the threshold for positive ROI of one; or net benefit with positive ROI as 
savings exceeding program costs. Second is recalculated ROI using net benefit to cost 
ratio with the threshold for positive ROI as zero to ensure comparability across studies. If 
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the study did not report ROI as its finding but reported program costs and benefits, then 
ROI was calculated using net benefit to cost ratio. The key for consistency in this review 
is to unify all ROI calculations across studies. Thus, the recalculated ROI measure is the 
outcome of interest. 
Monetized values were not adjusted to real values or discounted to have standard 
valuation across studies. Discounting would require extracting annual flow information 
for costs and savings, which was not possible for all of the papers in this analysis. We did 
not adjust the real values across studies for two reasons. First, studies with program and 
evaluation duration overlaps adjusted both costs and benefits for real values. Second, 
studies with program duration shorter than evaluation duration adjusted benefits using the 
price index of the program year. 
We used ordinary least square (OLS) regression to examine the conditional mean 
of ROI estimates across values of the quality index, organization size, program 
component (wellness or disease management), evaluated outcomes (costs of health care, 
absenteeism, and productivity), publication year, and study duration. We used estimated 
coefficients only to examine the mean effects and not to imply any causal relationship. 
Because few of the source papers included the standard error of the ROI estimate, the 
regression has not been adjusted for source study sampling variation and so should not be 
considered a true meta-regression. 
Quality Index 
A primary focus of this paper is the relationship between the methodological 
quality of studies and ROI estimates. To measure the methodological quality, we 
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extracted information from the included articles using a methodological rigor rubric that 
was adapted from the following checklists: Adams (1992), Gerard (1992), Sacristan 
(1993), and Downs and Black (1998). The methodological rigor rubric, presented in 
Appendix table 2.A1, includes domains for article characteristics, reporting, internal 
validity, external validity, and statistical power. We used eighteen equally weighted items 
(eight items from reporting, eight items from internal validity, one item from external 
validity, and one item from power) to calculate an overall quality index for each included 
article. 
Article Characteristics Domain 
Article characteristics include the following items: author(s), year that the study 
was published, journal in which the study was published, content of the evaluated 
program, country of the study, company or the industry that the study was evaluated, 
number of participants and nonparticipants, and size of the companies. In addition, we 
extracted the authors’ academic department(s) or research center(s) and the study funding 
agency to identify possible conflicts of interest. 
Information on WWP programmatic content was used to classify the program into 
two main categories: disease management and wellness program. A program is classified 
as disease management if it targeted diagnosable diseases (i.e. asthma or diabetes). A 
program is classified as wellness if it targeted health risks or behaviors (i.e. smoking, 
exercise, or nutrition). Based on this classification, some programs had the same 
components, such as weight loss and exercise, but they were not classified in the same 
category due to the program’s target outcome. 
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The size of the organization was determined based on either the number of 
employees that were eligible to participate to the program or the number of participants 
and nonparticipants. Some studies included multiple worksite with various sizes. For 
those, the size of the company is considered as not available if the study did not provide 
any specific information. 
Information from the authors’ conflict of interest acknowledgements, the funding 
sources of the study, and the department that conducted the study were used to evaluate 
potential conflict. 
Reporting Domain 
The reporting domain includes: objectives of the study, intervention, study 
sample, type of economic analysis, main outcomes, program cost, main findings, and 
statistical inference for the main outcomes. Each item can get a score of one if it was 
reported before the results section. We modified the condition of “reporting before 
results” for study sample, program costs, and statistical inference information, where 
each of these components can score one if they were reported anywhere in the article and 
zero otherwise. This modification helps to ensure that articles are not scored poorly due 
to different publication practices across disciplines. 
The study sample component has three equally weighted subcomponents: study 
population, sample selection criteria, and analysis sample. The study population 
component was scored one if information on eligible employees was provided and zero 
otherwise. The sample selection component was scored one if information on how 
eligible employees selected into intervention group was explained and zero otherwise. 
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The analysis sample item was scored one if information on final analytic sample was 
provided and zero otherwise. 
Internal Validity Domain 
The internal validity domain includes the following items: description of main 
outcome measures, study design, outcome evaluation method, cost measures and 
valuation, population that subjects were recruited from, period that subjects were 
recruited in, adjustment for different follow-up lengths or periods for groups, and attrition 
from the study sample. 
Description of main outcome measures, such as health care, absenteeism, and 
productivity, is scored one if evaluated outcomes and their measurements are clearly 
described and zero otherwise. Study design is scored 1 if the study is randomized, 0.75 if 
the study is quasi-experimental, 0.5 if the study is an observational cohort study with a 
control group, 0.25 if the study is an observational case study with a control group, and 0 
if the study is an observational study without a control group. 
Study design, which captures randomized, quasi-experimental, and observational 
studies, is an internal validity component that differs based on group (intervention and 
control) assignments and data collection. We classified studies as randomized if the study 
clearly stated the design and provides information on how the groups are assigned. We 
classified the study as quasi-experimental only if the paper clearly stated the design is 
quasi-experimental. Finally, we classified observational studies based on the use of 




Outcome evaluation method has two equally weighted subcomponents dealing 
with selection bias and using proper methods to estimate outcome variables. The first 
component is to identify if any method was used to increase the strength of causal 
inference if the study is not randomized. It is one if there is no evidence of possible 
selection bias or if there is an effort to reduce the selection bias such as using matching 
methods or intention-to-treat approach and zero otherwise. The second component is to 
identify if a proper method was used to estimate the program outcomes. It is one if the 
methods deal with issues such as clustering in randomized studies, skewed data, count 
data, binary data, etc. and zero otherwise. 
Cost measures and valuation have three equally weighted subcomponents 
describing and measuring intervention costs, discounting, and price adjustment. 
Describing and measuring intervention costs is scored one if direct measures (units and 
unit prices) were used or if a cost regression was used to estimate the marginal cost of 
implementing the intervention and zero otherwise. Discounting is scored one if the net 
present values for program cost and monetized outcomes were presented. Discounting is 
also scored one if there is no discounting, but the reason was explained, such as the study 
period being less than a year. Discounting is scored zero otherwise. Price adjustment is 
scored one if both program costs and monetized outcomes were adjusted for inflation. 
Price adjustment is also one if there is no adjustment, but the reason was explained, or if 
it is clear in the text that no adjustment was necessary due to the length of the follow-up 
period. Price adjustment is scored zero otherwise. 
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The population that subjects were recruited from is scored one if the participants 
and nonparticipants were selected from the same population and zero otherwise. The 
period that subjects were recruited in is one if participants and nonparticipants were 
selected from the same time period and zero otherwise. Adjustment for different follow-
up lengths is scored one if the follow-up was the same for all groups or if different 
follow-up lengths were properly accommodated in the analysis. Adjustment for different 
follow-up lengths is scored zero if the differences in follow-up across groups was 
ignored. Attrition from the study sample is scored one if it was mentioned, explained, and 
addressed in the analysis. Attrition from the study sample is also scored one if it was 
mentioned, but it was not handled because the loss was too small to affect the main 
findings. Attrition is scored zero otherwise. 
External Validity Domain 
There is one item in this domain to measure whether the study findings apply to 
the population. A case study needs to be externally valid for generalizability matters. 
However, WWPs are unique to their workplaces, which is one of the inherent issues with 
WWP evaluation literature that cannot generally be improved. They are not likely to be 
generalizable to other workplaces even if the program and study sample have similar 
characteristics. Therefore, we considered a study externally valid if the analyzed subjects 
represent the population from which they were recruited. 
Power Domain 
There is one item in this domain to measure whether the study has sufficient 
statistical power. This item is scored one if any information related to a formal power 
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analysis was found. Finding information related to statistical power in WWP evaluations 
is not common. Articles with power information provided either information on statistical 
power to ensure identification of the program effect or whether there is a decrease in 
power due to sample size. 
Additional Analysis Variables 
Organization Size 
Resources available for a wellness program and the impact of a wellness program 
might differ based on the company size. Thus, ROI findings are likely to vary with the 
size. In this analysis, organization size is classified in two categories: small (500 or less 
employees) and large (more than 500 employees). Size is the only company characteristic 
used in the analysis due to the lack of other information across studies. 
Program Component and Evaluated Outcomes 
Publications were categorized into wellness and disease management programs 
that target different outcomes. The aims were to identify the composition of disease 
management and wellness programs among the selected articles and to analyze whether 
ROI results significantly differ based on these components. 
Furthermore, studies were categorized based on the cost components included in 
the ROI analysis, such as costs of health care, absenteeism and productivity. Health care 
included pharmaceutical claims and medical claims of inpatient, outpatient, and 
emergency room visits. Absenteeism included work lost days, sickness absence days, 
disability days, or time away from work. Productivity mainly included presenteeism as 
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well as work performance. The aim is to analyze whether ROI results vary based on what 
was included in the benefits. 
Publication Year and Study Follow-up Length 
Publication year and the follow-up length are other two factors that might impact 
the ROI findings of studies. For the analysis, we used a year dummy variable that is one 
if the study was published in 2011 or after, and zero otherwise. The year 2011 was 
chosen to capture the potential impacts of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 on any 
publications’ findings. 
Study follow-up length matters to analyze short- and long-term effects of 
evaluated programs. We used a dummy variable that is one if the study follow-up was 
three years or longer, and zero otherwise. The three-year study duration was chosen 
based on the sample size. 
Sensitivity Analyses Measures 
Reduced Quality Index 
The reduced quality index includes the reporting and internal validity domains of 
the rigor rubric. All sixteen items are equally weighted. There are two reasons why we 
excluded the external validity and power items. First, both measures have limited 
conceptual relevance for WWP ROI studies, as explained in the Data section. Second, the 
primary analyses suggest that the excluded domains have limited empirical relevance 
compared to the included domains. The aim of the sensitivity analysis is to analyze if the 




Although the overall quality index includes the study design item, study design is 
likely to have a large impact on ROI findings individually. Therefore, a separate analysis 
is needed to identify that impact. In randomized studies, the researcher randomizes 
intervention and control groups from either eligible employees or employees who 
responded to a program invitation. Although assignment to groups was random, 
nonrandom selection into the group of eligible employees or invitees was possible as a 
result of the nature of participation in WWPs. In quasi-experimental studies, the 
researcher assigns the groups using a nonrandom procedure. In observational studies, the 
researcher allows employees to self-select into program participation, and often uses 
administrative data related to a wellness program and its outcomes. 
Estimation Methods for Monetized Outcomes (Benefits) 
Outcome estimation is an internal validity item that determines whether 
appropriate statistical methods were used to estimate costs and benefits. The statistical 
techniques must be appropriate to the data, such as if the data were not normally 
distributed (skewed data) or if nonparametric approaches were needed. This item is likely 
to have a high impact on ROI findings. 
Measuring Costs 
Publications are scored based on how much detail they provided on program costs 
and whether benefits and costs were discounted and adjusted for inflation when the 
follow-up period is over a year. Although measuring program costs is a quality index 
item, a separate analysis was needed to evaluate whether more detailed information on 
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costs does indeed impact the ROI findings. This separate analysis only includes the item 
of whether the study provided detailed program cost information. Discounting or real 
value adjustments were not included because monetized values were not adjusted to real 
values or discounted in this analysis to have standard valuation across studies. 
Additional Analysis 
Conflict of Interest 
Lack of independent studies in the economic evaluation literature of WWPs has 
been one of the most persistent critiques of the reliability of positive ROI findings. We 
therefore examine the distribution of articles that are independent without funding, 
independent with funding (where the funder was not the organization whose wellness 
program was evaluated), and not independent with funding (where the funder was the 
organization whose wellness program was evaluated). The aim is to show how many 
articles are independent and how many of them could potentially suffer from a conflict of 
interest, which might lead to biased findings for the evaluated program. 
Results 
Study Selection and Characteristics 
For this systematic review, 466 unduplicated articles were identified and 
abstracted for further review, as shown in figure 1. Of these, 78 articles met the inclusion 
criteria for the title and abstract screening. Thirty-three of those articles were selected for 
full text review. In addition, 11 articles were included from the publications’ reference 
lists, resulting in a total of 44 unique publications included in the review. 
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Tables 2.1-2.3 provide details for the key characteristics of included publications 
sorted by study design. Of all 44 publications, 13 were randomized studies, 4 were quasi-
experimental studies, 3 were observational cohort studies with a control group, 16 were 
observational case studies with a control group, and 8 were observational studies without 
a control group. Twenty-eight studies evaluated only wellness programs, 5 evaluated only 
disease management programs, and 11 evaluated both wellness and disease management 
programs. Thirty-four studies were conducted in companies in the United States, 8 in the 
Netherlands, and 1 each in Japan and Germany. All studies conducted in the Netherlands 
and Germany were randomized studies. 23 articles were published in the Journal of 
Occupational Environment and Medicine, 3 were published in the American Journal of 
Health Promotion. Primary authors of 19 articles authored only one paper in the review. 
Fifteen primary authors have two or more papers in the review. 
Half of the included articles were published after 2010 (2011 and after). The 
earliest publication was 1984 and the latest publication was 2017. The program start year 
differs from the publication year. The earliest program year goes back to 1977 and the 
latest program start year is 2013. Study follow-up length varies between 6 months to 15 
years. Half of the included articles were published after 2010 and most of the articles 
have follow-up lengths of one, three, or five years. 
Only 3 out of 44 publications evaluated a program in a small company. Of 44 
publications, 14 provided clear information on which organizations’ wellness programs 
were evaluated. Most of the studies stated the economic analyses were done from the 
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employer’s perspective, however none of the studies reported the actual objective of 
organizations for adopting WWPs. 
Of the 44 included articles, there is no information on funding source or conflicts 
of interest from 2 articles. Of the 42 articles with conflict of interest information, 24 had a 
statement of no authorial conflicts of interest. However, 10 out of 24 were funded by 
organizations, such as PepsiCo, Aetna, and University of Minnesota, whose wellness 
programs were being evaluated at the time of the study. In addition, 8 more articles did 
not acknowledge any conflicts of interest but had potential conflicts because they were 
funded by the same organization whose WWP was being evaluated. As a result, 18 (41%) 
included articles had potential conflicts of interest. 
Analysis Sample for ROI Analysis 
Twenty-eight studies reported an ROI outcome as shown in tables 2.4 and 2.5. 
Out of the 28, only 9 used net benefit to cost ratio as the ROI measure, as shown in tables 
2.4 and 2.5. Of the 28, 3 of them used net benefit to cost ratio as percentage to report ROI 
in percent. More than half of the studies reported ROI as benefit to cost ratio, which leads 
to a higher ROI finding by construction. Two articles did not provide any information on 
the ROI formula they used. Moreover, only 4 out of 28 studies, which were randomized, 
reported confidence interval information for the ROI estimate. Two of them found 
positive ROI which were not significant. 
We recalculated the ROI of 26 studies. We excluded 2 articles that did not have 
sufficient program cost information to perform the recalculations. In addition, we 
calculated the ROI of 3 studies, which did not provide ROI as outcome, using reported 
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program benefits and costs. Therefore, the final sample for the ROI regression analyses 
includes 29 articles with recalculated ROI outcomes. 
Table 2.6 summarizes information on recalculated ROI, quality indices, and the 
rubric domains for the analysis sample. The mean of recalculated ROI is 0.68 with a 
minimum of -12.61 and a maximum of 10.17. The mean of quality index with all 4 
domains is 11.97 points with a minimum of 5 and maximum of 18 points. The mean of 
the reduced quality index with the reporting and internal validity domains is 11.66 points, 
with a minimum of 5 and maximum of 16. 
Table 2.7 summarizes the characteristics of the articles used in the regression 
analyses and some of the internal validity components that we will detail in the sensitivity 
analyses. Of 29 publications, only 3 of them were conducted in small companies. Twenty 
studies evaluated only wellness programs, 4 evaluated only disease management 
programs, and 5 evaluated both wellness and disease management programs. Seven 
studies included only health care costs savings (losses) in the ROI, 7 included only 
absenteeism cost savings (losses), 4 included both health care and absenteeism cost 
savings (losses), and 11 included any combination of cost savings (losses) that included 
productivity. There are 17 studies published after 2010 and 18 studies with a follow-up 
length of at least 3 years. Of 29 articles, 6 were observational studies without a control 
group (base group), 9 were observational studies with a control group, 4 were quasi-
experimental studies, and 10 were randomized studies. Only 7 publications used proper 
statistical techniques to accommodate features of the study data. Nine publications 
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provided direct measures (units and unit prices) for program costs or cost regression to 
identify marginal costs. 
Regression Analyses 
We used OLS regressions to estimate the conditional mean of ROI estimates 
across studies. Coefficients from the OLS regressions should only be interpreted as 
differences in the conditional mean and not as causal effects. Although we present 
standard errors for regression coefficients, these standard errors do not account for the 
underlying sampling variation in the source studies because only 4 studies provided that 
information. Therefore, these regressions do not constitute a formal meta-analysis. 
Table 2.8 shows the results of the main regression analyses. Although none of the 
results are statistically significant, columns 1 through 6 nonetheless provide useful 
information on the differences in ROI across individual study characteristics. Higher 
quality studies reported lower ROI. Small company evaluations produced lower ROI. 
Studies that evaluated disease management (base group) produced higher ROI compared 
to evaluations that contained a wellness component. Studies that included only cost of 
absenteeism or both costs of absenteeism and health care reported lower ROI compared 
to studies that included only cost of health care (base group). Studies that included any 
cost of productivity also reported lower ROI estimates compared to studies that included 
only the cost of health care. Studies that included productivity costs have the lowest ROI 
estimates. Studies published after 2010 reported lower ROI compared to studies 
published 2010 and before. Studies with a follow-up length of more than 3 years 
produced lower ROI compared to studies with follow-ups of 3 years or less. Column 7 
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controls for all components simultaneously. The sign of the coefficients and significance 
do not change except for the small company indicator. 
The impacts of quality index, size indicator, and disease management and 
wellness program indicators are as expected. One would presume that adding more 
benefit components or lengthening the follow-up period could increase ROI due to 
potential increases in cost savings, yet the findings here suggest the opposite. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
Impact of Outliers 
The highest ROI value is 10.17 (Noben et al., 2015) and the lowest ROI value 
is -12.61 (van Holland et al., 2017). Both studies are randomized and evaluated programs 
in large organizations. These ROI values are extreme outliers relative to the interquartile 
range of ROI estimates (see Mann (2007), p. 117 for the definition of extreme outlier 
used here). After removing these outliers from the recalculated ROI, the sign and relative 
magnitude of mean effects remain the same, except for study follow-up length as shown 
in Appendix 2.A2, columns 1 through 6. When all study characteristics are included in 
the regression, the signs of quality index, company size indicator (small), cost of only 
absenteeism, and publication year indicator changed from negative to positive. The 
results may be sensitive to the outliers in ROI, but none of these results are statistically 
significant (Appendix 2.A2). 
Reduced Quality Index 
Table 2.9 shows the ROI regression results using the reduce quality index. The 
findings, which are presented in table 2.9 columns 1 and 2, are similar to the findings 
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when the full quality index was used. In addition, table 2.9 columns 3 and 4 show the 
mean effects of the two highest impact domains (reporting and internal validity) 
separately. Studies with higher reporting scores reported lower ROI compared to studies 
with lower reporting scores. The effects are significant at 5% level. Studies with higher 
internal validity scores reported higher ROI compared to studies with lower internal 
validity scores. The effect on column 3 is significant at 10% level. The rest of the 
findings for other control variables are similar to the main analysis. 
After removing outliers from the recalculated ROI, the sign and relative 
magnitude of mean effects remained the same, except for disease management and 
wellness program indicator, absenteeism cost, year indictor, and evaluation duration as 
shown in Appendix 2.A3 columns 3 and 4. In addition, the magnitudes for reporting 
variable decreased and lost significance. Mean effects are sensitive to extreme outliers in 
ROI (Appendix 2.A3). 
Mean Effects on ROI Using Internal Validity Items of Study Design, Estimation Methods, 
and Program Cost Valuations 
Table 2.10 shows the regression results for the internal validity items separately. 
Observational studies with a control group reported lower ROI compared to the 
observational studies without a control group. Similarly, randomized studies reported 
lower ROI compared to any other study design. ROI goes down if the design is more 
rigorous, except for the quasi-experimental studies. The classification of quasi-
experimental design depends on whether the study clearly reported the design as quasi-
experimental. Quasi-experimental studies might be misclassified due to missing 
 
 36 
information on design where the design relied on regression models to compare outcomes 
for intervention groups (Musich et al., 2015) or different outcomes were analyzed with 
different designs (Grossmeier et al., 2013). 
Studies that used proper estimation methods, as described in the Methods section, 
reported higher ROI compared to the studies that did not. Studies that provided detailed 
information on program costs reported higher ROI compared to studies that did not. 
Table 2.10 column 4 shows the mean effects when all these components are controlled. 
The direction of the coefficient and significance did not change, and the positive impact 
of detailed program costs had the highest impact on ROI estimates. 
After removing the outliers, the sign and the relative magnitude of the coefficients 
remained the same except for clearly described program costs as shown in Appendix 
2.A4. Studies that provided detailed information on program costs reported lower ROI 
findings compared to other studies. Program cost valuation is sensitive to outliers in ROI. 
Additional Analyses 
Conflicts of Interest 
Of the 29 articles in the ROI regression analyses, one did not provide sufficient 
information to determine conflicts of interest. Of the remaining 28 articles, 14 had a 
statement of no authorial conflict of interest. However, 4 out of those 14 articles were 
funded by organizations whose wellness programs were evaluated. In addition, 5 more 
articles that did not acknowledge any potential conflict of interest had a potential conflict 
for the same reason. 
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Table 2.10 column 5 presents the mean effects of conflict of interest on ROI. 
Articles with potential conflict of interest reported higher ROI. The findings remain the 
same when the outliers in ROI were removed from the sample (Appendix 2.A4). 
Discussion 
This systematic review suggests that higher methodological quality results in 
lower ROI of workplace wellness programs, corroborating an earlier systematic review 
(Baxter et al., 2014). Studies with higher quality made use of methods that could reduce 
the positive bias in ROI. Study design item of internal validity domain potentially had the 
highest impact on ROI findings due to selection bias in program outcomes. Moreover, 
study design influences the methods for data collection and evaluation that could impact 
all the other items in the internal validity domain. Self-selection into the program due to 
voluntary participation might cause overvalued program benefits. Missing details in 
program costs, such as units, unit prices, and opportunity costs, might also cause 
undervalued program costs. Positive bias in benefit valuations and negative bias in cost 
valuations could lead to positive bias in ROI. Thus, we tested the findings based on 
quality index components in details to understand the relationship between study quality 
and ROI findings. 
We used the reduced quality index that includes reporting and internal validity 
domains but excluded external validity and statistical power domains. The mean effects 
remained similar to what was found using quality index. We also used the reporting and 
internal validity domains separately instead of a quality index. The negative association 
between study quality and ROI was dominated by the reporting quality of the studies. 
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Higher internal validity scores were associated with higher ROI. Recent critiques 
of WWP ROI literature suggest that studies with greater internal validity should yield 
lower ROI estimates. To better understand the positive association of internal validity, we 
looked at internal validity items of study design, estimation methods, and program costs 
separately. Impacts of study design were as expected, where more rigorous design 
resulted in lower ROI. Studies that used appropriate outcome estimation methods, such as 
methods to deal with skewed or count data, reported higher ROI. The sign and magnitude 
of this effect might depend on valuation of benefits. Even if the methods control for non-
normality; health care, absenteeism, and productivity costs could be greatly skewed due 
to high outliers. In addition, these costs could show great variability at the organization 
and employee levels in terms of industry, wages, fulltime status, and department. 
Studies with more detailed program cost information that contained units, unit 
prices, and marginal cost estimations were expected to have lower ROI, due to higher 
estimates of program cost. However, the mean effects showed that studies with more 
detailed program cost reported higher ROI. The positive sign might be a result of high 
benefit levels in those studies. Third, we ran the analyses without extreme outliers. 
Although the results for quality indices were not sensitive, reporting and internal validity 
domains, as well as internal validity items, were sensitive to extreme outliers. 
Results from the reporting and internal validity domains suggest two important 
conclusions. First, the negative impacts of quality indices, which were found by this 
review, are driven by the reporting domain. Missing statistical inference information 
might be one of the contributor to this negative association. Included articles successfully 
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delivered information on all reporting items except for the statistical inference. Only four 
randomized studies reported confidence intervals around ROI. Providing confidence 
intervals for ROI is not common because ROI is measured as a ratio. An additional 
method such as bootstrapping is needed. This could be the easiest improvement in WWP 
evaluations. 
Second, having a positive effect for the internal validity is the most important 
result from a policy perspective. Recent critiques of the WWP ROI literature suggest that 
studies with greater internal validity should be yielding lower ROI estimates. That is, 
according to critics, ROI is expected to be lower with higher rigor in the methods that 
control for selection, deal with data issues, and detailed program costs. Yet we find that 
studies with greater internal validity (i.e., with stronger evidence for causal inference) 
have higher ROI estimates. In general, evaluation studies, regardless of study design, do 
not provide the distribution information of the benefits including outliers, which could be 
one of the contributor for positive association in estimation methods and ROI findings. 
In addition to methodological quality, this paper examines critiques that are 
associated with effectiveness of WWPs, such as organizations’ characteristics, program 
content, and conflict of interest. Industry, size, workplace environment, and resources for 
wellness programs are essential workplace characteristics that have an impact on reasons 
for WWP adoption and evaluation. Despite the popularity of these programs, the peer-
reviewed papers showed that the majority of evaluations have been done in large 
organizations with the motivation of cost savings and positive ROI. WWP evaluations 
need to include clear information about all organizations investing in WWPs, especially 
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about their motivation for adopting them. Even though the ACA has directed more 
resources to organizations for WWP evaluations, the issue remains. There is more 
information about how high cost health plans can be modified using wellness programs 
for large organizations, but not enough proof for small organizations and information on 
organizations’ reason for adoption other than positive ROI. 
One other issue is the content itself of WWPs. The findings of this paper show 
that WWPS with a disease management component report higher ROI. We need to be 
able to identify whether the evaluated WWP include a disease management or health 
prevention component. These components target a specific health condition, whereas 
wellness components target health behavior. Thus, WWPs with a specific outcome target 
could save more money compared to WWPs with only general wellness or health 
behavior targets.  
Finally, analyses showed that conflicts of interest arose due to evaluating the 
program internally, which resulted in higher ROI. Independent evaluation is an essential 
element to increasing the studies rigor. Eliminating conflicts of interest may be one of the 
hardest obstacles in the field due to the need to rely on the cooperation of the WWP host 
organizations. 
This systematic review has two main limitations. First, this study focused on ROI 
findings due to the focus of economic evaluation literature and the critiques in the field. 
However, the relevant outcomes from employers’ perspectives are varied and subject to 
change based on organizations’ characteristics. For example, a small nonprofit 
organization in a specific industry might adopt a WWP for corporate citizenship 
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purposes, whereas a large for-profit organization in the same industry might adopt a 
WWP to reduce turnover rate. The field clearly has neglected this distinction. Second, 
although the field can provide improvements in methods to deal with measurement errors 
in data collection and self-selection into program participation, these inherent limitations 
cannot be eliminated. Randomized clinical trials are very difficult, if not impossible, for 
legal and logistical reasons. In addition, some of the health-related data are not available 
even to an independent evaluator due to HIPAA regulations. 
This paper advances the field of economic evaluations of workplace wellness 
programs, in general, by providing information on areas that can improve methodological 
quality. Critiques in this field suggested that studies with higher internal validity resulted 
in lower ROI and the literature needed methods to improve internal validity, such as 
dealing with selection issues and estimation methods. However, this paper showed that 
the negative relationship between methodological quality and ROI was significant due to 
low reporting quality of papers. Lack of statistical inference information around ROI is 
an important issue. We cannot conduct a meta-analysis to derive common effects of 
WWPs when statistical inference information is missing. In addition, small organizations 
are underrepresented in this field. Although there are policies supporting small businesses 
adopting WWPs, we do not see that the field has the same focus on small organizations 
as much as larger companies and policymakers. The economic evaluation literature needs 
better reported peer-reviewed studies and attention on WWPs in companies with different 
characteristics, especially small companies with various and different reasons for WWP 
adoption. The research needs to validate whether WWPs can significantly impact public 
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health. The advancements suggested in this paper will help us understand private 
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Table 2.3. Summary of Characteristics for Included Articles 
 
Article Characteristics (N=44) Frequency Percentage 
Randomized studies 13 29.55 
Quasi-experimental studies 4 6.82 
Observational cohort studies with control group 3 6.82 
Observational case studies with control group 16 36.36 
Observational studies without control group 8 18.18 
Evaluated program: Only wellness 28 63.64 
Evaluated program: Only disease management 5 11.36 
Evaluated program: Wellness and disease management 11 25.00 
Country of evaluated program: United States 34 77.27 
Country of evaluated program: Netherlands 8 19.51 
Country of evaluated program: Germany 1 2.44 
Country of evaluated program: Japan 1 2.44 
Program in a small company  3 6.82 
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Table 2.5. ROI Content and Formulation for Articles that Provided ROI 
 
Formulation for ROI (N=28) Frequency Percentage 
Net benefit to cost ratio 6 21.43 
Net benefit to cost as percentage 3 10.71 
Net benefit 2 7.14 
Benefit to cost ratio 15 53.57 
No information 2 7.14 
Statistical inference information on ROI (N=28)   
Any statistical information is provided 4 14.81 
 
 
Table 2.6. Summary of Quality Indices, Checklist Domains, and Recalculated ROI for 
Analysis Sample 
 
Analysis Outcome (N=29) Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Recalculated ROI  0.68 3.57 -12.61 10.17 
Quality Index (N=29)     
Items are equally weighted 11.97 2.95 5.00 18.00 
Reduced quality index 11.66 2.57 5.00 16.00 
Rigor Rubric Main Domains (N=29)     
Reporting (8 items) 6.92 0.75 4.00 8.00 
Internal Validity (7 items) 4.74 2.05 1.00 8.00 
External validity (1 item) 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 




Table 2.7. Summary of Characteristics for Analysis Sample That Has Recalculated ROI 
Measure 
 
Article Characteristics (N=29)   
Program in a small company  3 10.34 
Evaluated program: Only wellness 20 68.97 
Evaluated program: Only disease management 4 13.79 
Evaluated program: Wellness and disease management 5 17.24 
ROI with only health care cost 7 24.14 
ROI with only absenteeism cost 7 24.14 
ROI with health care and absenteeism 4 13.79 
ROI with health care and productivity 4 13.79 
ROI with absenteeism and productivity 3 10.34 
ROI with health care, absenteeism, and productivity 4 13.79 
Published after 2010 17 58.62 
Study duration is at least three years 18 62.07 
Internal validity item 1: Study design (N=29) Frequency Percentage 
Randomized studies 10 34.48 
Quasi-experimental studies 4 13.79 
Observational cohort studies with control group 1 3.45 
Observational case studies with control group 8 27.59 
Observational studies without control group 6 20.69 
Internal validity item 3: Estimation method (N=29)   
Appropriate methods for outcome estimates 7 24.14 
Internal validity item 4: Valuation of cost (N=29)   
Program cost measures are clearly described 9 31.03 
Conflict of Interest (N=29)   
Based on funding source 9 32.14 




Table 2.8. Mean Effects on Recalculated ROI: Quality Index (Items Equally Weighted) 
and Article Characteristics 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Quality index: Items are  -0.033 
     
-0.018 
equally weighted (0.233) 
     
(0.405) 
Programs in a small  
 
-0.010 





    
(3.462) 
Only disease management  
  
1.272 





   
(2.620) 
Disease management and  
  
0.729 





   
(2.473) 
Only absenteeism costs3  
   
-0.564 
  




Health care and  









Any productivity cost3,4    -1.968   -3.163 
    (1.781)   (2.421) 
Publication year dummy  









Evaluation duration (at  
     
-0.747 -2.468 
least 3 years)6 
     
(1.386) (2.198) 
Constant 1.084 0.684 0.382 1.688 0.848 1.147 4.993  
(2.871) (0.714) (0.822) (1.392) (1.050) (1.092) (6.452) 
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Notes: 1. Small is 1 if the company has 500 and less employees, 0 otherwise. 
2. The base category is “Only wellness program” 
3. The base category is only health care cost.  
4. This component includes combinations of costs that include productivity (presenteeism and else) 
5. Year dummy is 1 if the study was published after 2010 (2011 and after) 




Table 2.9. Mean Effects on Recalculated ROI: Reduced Quality Index and Quality Index 
Domains and Article Characteristics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reduce quality index -0.032 -0.041    
(0.267) (0.455)   
Reporting (8 items) 
 
 -2.474** -3.320**   
 (1.061) (1.346) 
Internal validity (8 items) 
 
 0.672* 0.753   
 (0.387) (0.507) 
Programs in a small company1  -0.017  -1.825  
 (3.485)  (3.150) 
Only disease management program2  0.428  0.277  
 (2.584)  (2.276) 
Disease management and wellness programs2  1.049  -0.509  
 (2.447)  (2.239) 
Only absenteeism costs3   -1.803  -0.587  
 (2.929)  (2.623) 
Health care and absenteeism costs3   -2.313  -1.338  
 (3.157)  (2.806) 
Any productivity cost3,4  -3.178  -3.515 
  (2.428)  (2.142) 
Publication year dummy (2011)5  -1.447  -0.371  
 (2.171)  (1.958) 
Evaluation duration (at least 3 years)6  -2.477  -2.106 
  (2.169)  (1.915) 
Constant 1.059 5.271 14.616** 23.508**  
(3.188) (6.766) (6.444) (9.306) 
Observations 29 29 29 29 
Notes: 1. Small is 1 if the company has 500 and less employees, 0 otherwise. 
2. The base category is “Only wellness program” 
3. The base category is only health care cost.  
4. This component includes combinations of costs that include productivity (presenteeism and 
else) 
5. Year dummy is 1 if the study was published after 2010 (2011 and after) 




Table 2.10. Mean Effects on Calculated ROI: Quality Index Some Subcomponents 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Observational studies with control group -0.053 
  
























Program cost measures are clearly described 
  
0.559 1.859     
(1.457) (1.794)  
Conflict of interest     0.876 
     (1.490) 
Constant 0.900 0.506 0.510 0.900 0.273  
(1.508) (0.773) (0.812) (1.536) (0.845) 
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Table 2.A1. Methodological Rigor Rubric and Quality Index 
 
Domains Checklist Explanation Responses Source 
(Item 
Number) 
1. Article 1.1. Who is the author?  Full list of authors   
 
  1.2. What is the title of the 
article? 
 Title of the article   
 
  1.3. What was year the 
study conducted/published? 




  1.4. If published which 
journal? 




  1.5. What is evaluated? Disease management (DM) or 





  1.6. What is the country of 
study? 
Name of the country that the 
study was conducted 
  Gerard, 
1992 (5) 
  1.7. What is the 
industry/company? 




 1.8. The size of the worksite 
that wellness program took 
place.  
If 500 and less employees 





        1.8.1 Number of 
participant and 
nonparticipants 




 1.9. What academic 
department or research 
center conducted the study? 
To compare with funding 
agency (1.10 and 1.11) for 
possible conflicts of interest 
 Gerard, 
1992 (6) 
  1.10. Who is the funding 
agency? 
To compare with academic 
department (1.9) for possible 
conflicts of interest 
  Gerard, 
1992 (8) 
  1.11. Are there authorial 
conflicting interests 
Article states any conflicts of 
interest 
0 or 1 Evers, 
2005 (18) 
Rigor       
 
2. Reporting  Are the followings items 
clearly described / reported 
before the results? 
2.3, 2.6 and 2.8 are not 
necessarily before the results 
section because the reporting 
varies based on journals. 
  
 
  2.1. Objectives of the study  Objectives of the study are 
reported before results 
0 or 1 Downs 
and Black, 
1998 (1) 
  2.2. Intervention(s) Programs that are to be 
evaluated are clearly described 
before the results 







Table 2.A1. Methodological Rigor Rubric and Quality Index (Continued) 
 
Domains Checklist Explanation Responses Source 
(Item 
Number) 
  2.3. Study sample The characteristics of the 
(non)participants included in the 
study are clearly described. Each 
sub question has equal weight in 
contributing to 2.3 
0, 0.33, 




        2.3.1. Study population The information on eligible 
employee population is provided 
0 or 1 Evers, 
2005 (1) 
        2.3.2. Inclusion/exclusion 
criteria 
The information on selection 
criteria from eligibility to 
participation is provided 
0 or 1 Downs and 
Black, 
1998 (3) 
        2.3.3. Analysis sample The information on analysis 
sample is provided 
0 or 1 Downs and 
Black, 
1998 (3) 
  2.4. Type of the economic 
analysis 
Type of the economic analysis 
(Cost-benefit, cost-effectiveness, 
cost-utility, cost analyses) is 
reported before results 
0 or 1 Sacristan, 
1993 (7) 
  2.5. Main outcome(s) Main outcomes including clinical 
and monetized outcomes are 
reported before results 
0 or 1 Downs and 
Black, 
1998 (2) 
  2.6. Intervention costs Overall program cost is reported. 
Details not needed for this 
question. Details are in 3.3 and 3.4 
0 or 1 
 
  2.7. Main finding(s) Main findings are reported before 
results. There is no need for 
statistical inference information 
for this question 
0 or 1 Downs and 
Black, 
1998 (6) 
  2.8. Statistical inference 
information about the main 
outcomes (interquartile 
change, standard errors, 
standard deviations, 
confidence interval, p-values) 
Statistical inference information is 
provided for all the outcomes 






Table 2.A1. Methodological Rigor Rubric and Quality Index (Continued) 
 





      
 
  3.1. Were the main 
outcome measures used 
clearly described? 
Clear description of what the 
outcomes included and how they 
were measured 
0 or 1 Evers, 
2005 
(10,11,12) 
  3.2. Were study subjects 
randomized to intervention 
groups? (0. Observational 
case or cohort without 
control group, 1. 
Observational case with 
control group, 2. 
Observational cohort with 
control group, 3. quasi-
experimental, 4. 
Randomized 
The rank range (0-4) is 
normalized to 0-1 range by 
weighting the answers. 
0, 0.25, 
0.50, 





  3.3. Was the method used 
to assess the main 
outcomes appropriate? 
Average of 3.3.1.-3.3.2. Each sub 
question has equal weight in 
contributing to 3.3 






       3.3.1. When not 
randomized, was any 
method used to deal with 
selection bias? 
Whether the analyses on 
participants were intention-to-
treat; whether the distribution of 
confounders in the different 
participant groups was described 
and differences were taken into 
account e.g. Matching method 




       3.3.2. Appropriate 
method for outcome 
estimates 
The statistical techniques must be 
appropriate to the data such as if 
the data were not normally 
distributed (skewed data), or if 
nonparametric approaches were 
needed. Does the estimation 
method take skewness in the data 
into account (e.g. Count data, 
binary data models etc.) 





Table 2.A1. Methodological Rigor Rubric and Quality Index (Continued) 
 
Domains Checklist Explanation Responses Source 
(Item 
Number) 
  3.4. Were the costs 
measured and valued 
appropriately? 
Average of three main 
components. 3.5.1, 3.5.2 and 
3.5.3. Each sub question has 
equal weight in contributing to 
3.5 
0, 0.33, 







       3.4.1. Were the 
intervention cost measures 
used clearly described? 
Direct measures (units and unit 
prices) or cost regression to 
identify marginal costs 




       3.4.2. Were monetized 
outcomes and intervention 
costs discounted when the 
costs were over a year? If 
not discounted was the 
reason explained? 
1 if discounted. 1 if not 
discounted but reason was 
explained. 0 if no discounting 
and no explanation 




       3.4.3. Were costs 
adjusted to real values/ 
inflation? 
 1 if adjusted. 1 if not adjusted 
but reason was explained. 0 if no 
adjustment and no explanation 
0 or 1 Evers, 
2005 (9) 
  3.5. Were control and 
treated (or cohorts) 
recruited from the same 
population? 
 1 if the answer is yes. 0 if 
groups from different 
population. 0 if there is no 
control group 
0 or 1 Downs and 
Black, 
1998 (21) 
  3.6. Were control and 
treated (or cohorts) 
recruited from the same 
period? 
1 if the answer is yes. 0 if the 
answer is no. 0 if the study 
period was not specified 
0 or 1 Downs and 
Black, 
1998 (22) 
       3.6.1. What was the 
study period 
Explicitly stated the 




  3.7. Did the analyses adjust 
for different follow-up 
lengths in cohort or case-
control studies? Or was the 
period between intervention 
and outcome the same for 
cases on controls? 
1 if the follow-up was the same 
for all groups. 1 if different 
lengths were adjusted. 0 if the 
difference were ignored 
0 or 1 Downs and 
Black, 
1998 (17) 
  3.8. Were attrition/ losses 
from follow-ups taken into 
account? 
1 if it was mentioned and how it 
handled was explained. 1 if it 
was mentioned and was not 
handled but lost was too small to 
affect main findings. 0 if it was 
mentioned but was not handled. 
0 if it was not mentioned. 
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4.1. Subjects participated 
in the study represents 
entire population from 
which they were 
recruited? 
Validation that the sample was 
representative would include 
demonstrating that the distribution 
of the main confounding factors 
was the same in the study sample 
and the source population 





5. Power 5.1. Did study have 
sufficient power to detect 
a clinically important 
effect? (p-values) 
Sample sizes have been calculated 
to detect a difference of x% and 
y%. 







Sum the values of reporting items (2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 
2.7, 2.8), internal validity items (3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 




Table 2.A2. Mean Effects on Recalculated ROI: Quality Index (Items Equally Weighted) 
and Article Characteristics (Excludes Outliers1) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Quality index: Items are  -0.026 
     
0.048 
equally weighted (0.125) 
     
(0.203) 
Programs in a small company2 
 
-0.168 
    
0.319   
(1.166) 
    
(1.743) 
Only disease management 
  
1.094 





   
(1.333) 
Disease management and  
  
0.551 





   
(1.272) 
Only absenteeism costs4  
   
-0.564 
  




Health care and absenteeism  









Any productivity cost4,5    -1.760*   -0.980 
    (0.926)   (1.287) 
Publication year dummy  









Evaluation duration (at least 3  
     
0.920 1.026 
years)7 
     
(0.736) (1.200) 
Constant 1.136 0.843** 0.560 1.688** 0.848 0.245 -0.667  
(1.520) (0.389) (0.447) (0.694) (0.550) (0.584) (3.316) 
Observations 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Notes: 1. Extreme outliers of ROI which was below Q1-IQR*3 and above Q3+IQR*3 where Q1 is 25th 
percentile, Q3 is the 75th percentile, and IQR is the interquartile range 
2. Small is 1 if the company has 500 and less employees, 0 otherwise 
3. The base category is “Only wellness program” 
4. The base category is only health care cost 
5. This component includes combinations of costs that include productivity (presenteeism and else) 
6 Year dummy is 1 if the study was published after 2010 (2011 and after) 




Table 2.A3. Mean Effects on Recalculated ROI: Reduced Quality Index and Quality 
Index Domains and Article Characteristics (Excludes Outliers1) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reduce quality index -0.038 -0.030    
(0.142) (0.228)   
Reporting (8 items) 
 
 -0.487 -0.851   
 (0.662) (0.861) 
Internal validity (7 items) 
 
 0.094 0.168   
 (0.237) (0.303) 
Programs in a small company2  -0.112  -0.553  
 (1.760)  (1.817) 
Only disease management program3  1.570  1.458  
 (1.316)  (1.322) 
Disease management and wellness programs3  0.440  0.098  
 (1.262)  (1.310) 
Only absenteeism costs4  0.562  0.703  
 (1.499)  (1.506) 
Health care and absenteeism costs4  -0.197  -0.103  
 (1.612)  (1.616) 
Any productivity cost4,5  -1.022  -1.262 
  (1.290)  (1.314) 
Publication year dummy (2011)6  0.296  0.439  
 (1.153)  (1.163) 
Evaluation duration (at least 3 years)7  0.940  0.794 
  (1.184)  (1.194) 
Constant 1.258 0.338 3.746 5.243  
(1.679) (3.452) (3.959) (6.044) 
Observations 27 27 27 27 
Notes: 1. Extreme outliers of ROI which was below Q1-IQR*3 and above Q3+IQR*3 where 
Q1 is 25th percentile, Q3 is the 75th percentile, and IQR is the interquartile range 
2. Small is 1 if the company has 500 and less employees, 0 otherwise 
3. The base category is “Only wellness program” 
4. The base category is only health care cost 
5. This component includes combinations of costs that include productivity (presenteeism and 
else) 
6 Year dummy is 1 if the study was published after 2010 (2011 and after) 




Table 2.A4. Mean Effects on Calculated ROI: Quality Index Some Subcomponents 
(Excludes outliers1) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Observational studies with control group2 -0.053 
  
























Program cost measures are clearly described 
  
-1.269 -0.893     
(0.762) (0.964)  
Conflict of interest     0.689 
     (0.787) 
Constant 0.900 0.678 1.200*** 0.900 0.560  
(0.756) (0.422) (0.415) (0.775) (0.463) 
Observations 27 27 27 27 26 
Notes: 1. Extreme outliers of ROI which was below Q1-IQR*3 and above Q3+IQR*3 where Q1 is 
25th percentile, Q3 is the 75th percentile, and IQR is the interquartile range 






WHY DO FIRMS IMPLEMENT WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS? 
 




Avoidable behavior-related risk factors, such as physical inactivity, unhealthy 
eating habits, obesity, and high cholesterol have become major health issues that impose 
high costs on individuals, businesses, and governments. The total of direct costs 
(treatment costs) and indirect costs (lost income and productivity) of chronic illnesses 
reached $3.7 trillion in the U.S. in 2016, which was almost 20 percent of GDP (Waters 
and Graf, 2018). Government wants to improve population health to avoid high health 
care costs due to their share in government spending. Workplace wellness programs 
(WWPs) have been used to change health behavior to reduce risk factors and prevent 
chronic illnesses (WHO, 2005; Mattke et al., 2013; Edington et al., 2014). The U.S. 
government enacted the largest public investment in the U.S. for WWPs through the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) to improve public health 
(Anderko et al., 2012; Mattke et al., 2013) and reduce health care costs. The ACA 
provides financial and technical support for the private sector in promoting health and 
evaluating WWPs. The U.S. National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety 
(NIOSH) launched the Total Worker Health (TWH) program in 2011. The TWH 
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establishes the persistent need for worksite research on WWP implementation and 
diffusion (NIOSH, 2012). 
Investments in WWPs as public health policy tools require rigorous evaluations to 
provide evidence on the effectiveness of these programs. There are two main issues 
regarding the effectiveness of WWPs. The first is the assumption that ROI is the main 
organizational strategy for implementing WWPs. However, this narrow perspective 
excludes the alignment of organizational values and program outcomes to create healthier 
workplaces (Edington et al, 2016). The second is the critiques on aligning public and 
private perspectives on evaluated program outcomes. Encouraging policy-makers to 
invest in workplace wellness requires a clear understanding of the objectives and the 
outcomes of the programs from both public and private perspectives (Fielding, 1984). 
Large companies with the objective of gaining positive returns to maximize profit 
have constituted the majority of economic evaluations. The ACA and NIOSH support 
WWP implementation and research in areas where the private market falls short. To 
receive and maintain government assistance, companies need to prove that WWPs are 
successful at promoting health and reducing health care costs. To support public health 
policy, businesses need to link a business’ reasons of choosing WWPs to its program 
decision. We also can test the assumption that financial savings is the main reason for the 
implementation of WWPs. We also provide evidence on to what extent ROI explains 
WWP implementation. 
Currently, there is no theoretical or empirical study on companies’ decision-
making processes on offering the most effective WWPs to accomplish their objectives 
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given the resources. This study is the first paper that develops an economic model to 
evaluate firms’ behavior beyond profit maximization when choosing WWPs. The model 
allows for both profit maximizing objectives and objectives other than profit, such as 
utility from corporate citizenship. We maximize the overall objective function of a firm 
with respect to WWP choices and derive a system of demand equations for WWPs where 
we can look at the attributes of reasons for WWP implementations on each WWP choice. 
We estimate the system of equations using Well Workplace Checklist (WWC) data 
established by the Wellness Council of America (WELCOA). Using the estimates of 
WWP equations, we can link business’ reasons of choosing WWPs to program decision. 
We also can test the assumption that financial savings drive the implementation of 
WWPs; provide evidence on to what extent ROI explains WWP implementation. 
Background 
WWPs need to be a part of organizational strategic plans to achieve 
organizational objectives. However, either the external wellness program providers or a 
companies’ wellness teams tend to choose popular programs that exit in the wellness 
market. Objectives for WWP implementation depends on organizations’ needs and 
characteristics (Mattke et al., 2013; Edington et al., 2014; Kaiser Family Foundation, 
2017). For successful programs, WWP choices should reflect the needs and 
characteristics. A systematic review on WWPs in the U.S. finds that improving health 
and reducing health care costs are common evaluated outcomes (Mattke et al., 2013). 
This narrow focus does not provide any information about organization’s corporate 
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strategies on social responsibility to create healthy workplace culture and environment 
(Kickbusch and Payne, 2003; Kirkland, 2014; Martinez-Lemos, 2015). 
Organizational characteristics, such as industry, size, and profit structure (for-
profit, nonprofit, and not-for-profit) influence the company’s choices to achieve its 
objectives. Different industries are subject to different regulations and working 
conditions that determine the need and content of WWPs. The annual survey of the 
Kaiser Foundation in 2017 shows that service and manufacturing industries implement 
WWPs in higher proportions when compared to other industries. The size of the company 
affects the available resources, where large companies potentially have the advantage to 
generate resources for financial and logistic needs to implement and evaluate their WWPs 
(McCoy et al., 2014). The annual survey of the Kaiser Foundation in 2017 shows large 
companies, which has 200 and more employees, implemented WWPs have higher 
proportion compared to small companies. The systematic review of this dissertation 
shows that only 10 percent of included articles evaluated a WWP in a small company, 
which has less than 500 employees. Although the profit structure determines the 
objective for implementing WWPS, there is no research on how profit structure could 
affect the decision-making process. 
In addition to aligning program objectives and program choice within 
organizations, aligning public and private value propositions is essential for public policy 
to achieve social welfare objectives of improving employee wellness. The alignment is 
relevant to government support in health care, such as the ACA in the US where the Act 
invested in private provision of WWPs to promote health and reduce risk factors. 
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Although research does not necessarily align either program choices with organizational 
objectives or with the value propositions of stakeholders, in practice we observe a shift 
where organizations view WWPs as a part of organizational strategy (Berry et al., 2010). 
To realize the full potential of WWPs, best practices to guide organizations were 
developed by academic and practitioner experts (O’Donnell et al., 1997; Goetzel et al., 
1998; Chapman, 2004). Although different organizations have different reasons for 
wellness programs, establishing main pillars for best workplace wellness practices help 
employers to attain their program objectives. 
Linkage to business objectives, leadership commitment, employee engagement, 
organizational and environmental support, and integrating relevant systems are some of 
the common areas identified by the following checklists: Well Workplace Checklist 
(WWC), Health Enhancement Research Organization (HERO), American Health 
Association (AHA), and National Workplace Health Promotion Survey (Chapman, 2004; 
Terry et al., 2008; Schill and Chosewood, 2013; Kent et al., 2016; O’Donnell, 2016). 
The Well Workplace Checklist 
We use data from WELCOA’s WWC. The Wellness Council of America 
(WELCOA) was established as a national nonprofit organization in the mid-1980s. 
WELCOA provides resources for building high-performing healthy workplaces by 
enhancing employee well-being and improving organizational outcomes. In the 1990s, 
WELCOA initiated the Well Workplace Checklist (WWC), which is an online survey, to 
assess the quality of workplace wellness practices within organizations. The quality is 
assessed over seven benchmarks including capturing senior leadership (upper 
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management) support, creating wellness teams, data collection, operating plans, choosing 
proper interventions, supportive health promoting environment, and program evaluations. 
The WWC benchmarks provide insight into companies’ wellness initiatives and lays out 
the characteristics for the best practices of workplace wellness. Beyond the availability of 
the data, the WWC is one of the most comprehensive efforts for the benchmarks. 
The WWC includes questions about company characteristics and the benchmarks 
that WELCOA determined for best practices in workplace wellness. The demographics 
include questions about company size, industry, unionization, multiple sites, and multiple 
shifts. Other company characteristics include questions on companies’ wellness 
programs. These questions include how long the wellness initiatives have been in place, 
how the WWPs are paid, participation rates, department which runs WWPs, annual 
budget for WWPs, and reason for WWP implementation. 
There are seven benchmarks with a series of questions related to quality measures 
for senior leader (upper management) support, wellness teams, data collection, operating 
plans, programming, supportive environment, and evaluations. Each question within a 
benchmark was values between 0-100 where “0” is need improvement, “25” is good, 
“50” is very good, “75” is excellent, and”100” is superior. The focus of this paper is on 
the wellness programs. Thus, we only explain programming benchmark in the data 
section. The first benchmark, senior leader support, is to measure the strength of senior 
leadership to achieve successful WWP implementations. Questions evaluate CEO’s 
communication, resource allocation, delegation, and health promotion practices. The 
second benchmark, wellness team, is to assess the quality of wellness team. A well-
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functioning team is important to create and deliver effective programs. Questions 
measure wellness team’s history and composition and operating methods. The third 
benchmark, data collection, evaluates organization’s efforts for collecting data. Questions 
ask information on organizational data, employee data, and environmental data 
collections, and employee protection data. The fourth benchmark, operating plan, is to 
evaluate the communication as to what the program will accomplish. Questions ask 
whether the operating plan has the following: overall mission/vision statement, 
measurable objectives, and link wellness goals to strategic priorities and outcomes, 
timeline, responsibilities, budget, and evaluation of stated goals. The fifth benchmark, 
programming, is to assess organization’s choice of health promotion interventions to its 
employees. The focus of this paper is the programming benchmark. We provide detailed 
information on questions for programming in the following subsection. The sixth 
benchmark, supportive environment, is to evaluate workplace environments that 
influence employees’ decisions on healthier behaviors. Questions ask whether there is 
environmental support on physical activity like onsite facility, nutrition/weight 
management like healthy food options, occupational safety, stress management, 
prohibiting alcohol and drug use, restricting regulations for tobacco use, and providing 
wellness initiatives. The seventh benchmark, evaluations, is to assess wellness evaluation 
efforts. Questions ask whether the organization is tracking participation and satisfaction, 
assessing risk and biometric measures, measuring changes in the environment like 
working conditions, and analyzing economic outcomes. 
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Data 
WELCOA provided data on organizations who voluntarily completed the WWC 
for the years 2008-2015. During these years, new organizations entered the sample, and 
some dropped out. The initial sample included 5,433 checklist entries as described in 
Weaver et al. (2016). Multiple entries of an organization within a year were excluded. 
We only kept the most recent entry within a year to avoid duplicates of an organization in 
a given year. Of the remaining, some entries that were completed for test purposes were 
excluded, as well as the entries that had missing demographic variables making it unclear 
as to whether it was a test or mock entry. International-based organizations were 
excluded from the sample because these organizations could be subject to legal 
regulations. In addition, there were only a very small number of international based 
organizations. Only an organizations’ first entry to the checklist was included in this 
sample in order to avoid measurement issues that could arise due to experience in filing 
the survey. Companies that chose more than two reasons for WWP implementation were 
also excluded because: (1) the survey asks to choose top two reasons and (2) some 
companies picked up to 12 reasons out of 13 reasons which is not informative about the 
reason for implementation because they are not ranked. Thus, the final analysis sample 
includes 3695 companies (Figure 3.1). 
Analysis Variables 
There were 14 questions that asked which WWPs were implemented in the 
organization. The first two questions asked whether the organization had offered 
employees the opportunity to participate in a health risk appraisal (HRA) or a health 
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screening, respectively. Answers were categorized as “12 months,” “24 months,” “36 
months,” “48 months,” and “not offered.” We generated binary variables of health risk 
appraisal and screening that took on value one if the answer was “12 months,” and zero 
otherwise. The remaining program-related questions, which are listed in the Background 
subsection, asked about the topic and formats of the organization’s WWPs over the last 
12 months. Answers were categorized as “awareness,” “awareness and education,” 
“awareness, education, and behavioral change,” “awareness, education, behavioral 
change, and culture enhancement,” and “not offered.” We generated binary variables for 
each program that took on value one if the answer was “awareness,” “awareness and 
education,” “awareness, education, and behavioral change,” “awareness, education, 
behavioral change, or culture enhancement,” and zero otherwise. 
There were thirteen reasons for WWP implementation that were included as 
response options on the checklist. The implementation reasons are listed as “improve 
employee health,” ”improve health of spouses and dependents,” “improve health of 
retirees,” “increase employee responsibility for managing personal health,” “contain 
health care costs,” “produce a return on investment,” “reduce unnecessary medical care 
utilization,” “increase work performance (reduce presenteeism),” “enhance productivity,” 
“reduce absenteeism,” “meet employees’ requests,” “attract and retain employees,” and 
“improve employee morale.” Organizations are asked to pick their top two reasons for 
implementing WWPs. A binary variable was generated for each reason separately that 
took on a value of one if the organization picked that reason. Companies were asked to 
select their top two reasons, in no particular ranked order. Thus, we excluded companies 
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that picked more than two reasons from the analysis to avoid measurement errors. To 
avoid small sample size issues in the analysis, we excluded health of retirees as a reason 
and grouped some of the reasons. Performance reason was grouped by including increase 
work performance (reduce presenteeism), enhance productivity, and absenteeism. 
Retention reason was grouped by including meet employees’ requests, attract, and retain 
employees. 
We used three company characteristics in our analysis: WWP experience in years, 
size, and industry. How long wellness programs have been in place is categorized as “just 
started,” “1-3 years,” “4-10 years,” and “more than 10 years.” We generated binary 
variables for three different experience levels. The first is inexperienced (just started). 
This captures companies that started offering WWPs less than a year ago at the year of 
checklist entry. The second is 1-3 years. These companies offered WWPs 1 to 3 years 
before the year of checklist entry. The third is companies experienced more than 3 years. 
These companies offered WWPs at least four years before the year of checklist entry. 
Company size is categorized as under 50, 50-100,101-500, 501-1000, 1001-4999, 
and 5000+. We generated a binary variable for small companies that took on a value of 
one if the company size was 500 or less employees, and zero otherwise. There were more 
than ten industries classified in the checklist. Industry includes manufacturing, services, 
communication, agricultural, construction, wholesale and retail, transportation, utilities, 
mining, and other (listed in the WWC). We generated two binary variables for 
manufacturing and service industries. We included only two main industries due to the 
small sample sizes in each industry. 
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The entry year of the checklist could affect the reason for WWP implementation 
and which program to implement because of trends and regulations at the company or 
government level. We generated a binary variable that took on a value of one if the entry 
year was 2011 or after, and zero otherwise. We chose 2011 to control for policy change 
due to the Affordable Care Act of 2010. We chose the year after the ACA to account for 
potential delays in implementing the policy in workplaces. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 shows the WWP experience frequencies. There were 1,102 
inexperienced companies, 1,306 companies with 1-3 years of experience, and 1,287 
companies with more than 3 years of experience. Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics 
for reasons for WWP implementation and company characteristics. Improving employee 
health, which was selected by 50-60 percent of companies, and containing health care 
costs, which was selected by 60-70 percent of companies, were the top reasons for WWP 
implementation for all experience levels. Producing a ROI was selected by 3-5 percent of 
companies depending on the WWP experience level. Around half of the companies in the 
checklist were in the service industry. Seventy-one percent of just started companies were 
small, whereas around 40-50 percent of companies with some WWP experience were 
small companies. Around half of the sample entered the checklist after 2010.  
Figures 3.2-3.4 present the shifts in the WWP implementation reasons over time 
based on WWP experience levels. Figure 3.2 shows that containing health care costs as 
reason for WWP implementation has been decreasing in frequency for inexperienced and 
1-3-year experienced companies. Change in frequencies is higher in the inexperienced 
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sample compared to experienced companies. Overall, ROI and health care utilization are 
less popular reasons for WWP implementation for any experience level. However, we 
observe a slight decrease in frequencies for inexperienced companies after 2013 and an 
increase in frequencies for experienced companies. 
Figure 3.3 shows that improving employee health is the most popular health 
reason for WWP implementation. All the health reasons remained consistent over the 
years other than slight changes in frequencies of employee health reason. Figure 3.4 
shows the trends for performance, retention, and morale reasons. Performance as a reason 
slightly increased in frequencies after 2013 for inexperienced and 1-3-year experienced 
companies. Employee morale and retention as reasons for WWP implementation 
increased in frequencies after 2012 only for inexperienced companies. Performance, 
retention, and morale reasons remained consistent over years for companies with more 
than 3-year experience. 
Table 3.3 depicts the descriptive statistics for implemented WWPs. Physical 
activity and nutrition/weight management programs were the most preferred WWP 
programs. Over 80 percent of companies in full sample, over 50 percent of companies in 
the inexperienced sample, and over 90 percent of companies in the more experienced 
sample selected one of these two programs. Stress management and safety/health 
protection were the other highly preferred programs for the full sample. Overall, means 
for WWPs for the inexperienced sample were lower compared to the WWP experienced 
samples. 
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Figures 3.5-3.8 present the patterns for the most preferred wellness programs over 
the reasons for WWP implementation. We picked the most preferred health and cost 
reasons as well as employee morale to provide more insight for the descriptive 
information. Physical activity and nutrition/weight management programs were preferred 
by most of the companies regardless of the reason and experience level. If the reason for 
implementation was to contain health care costs, most of the inexperienced companies 
preferred offering smoking cessation program and most of the experienced companies 
preferred offering HRA and biometric screenings. If the reason for implementation is 
improving employee health, most of the inexperienced companies preferred offering 
smoking cessation program; most of the experienced companies preferred offering stress 
management programs. If the reason for implementation was to improve employee 
morale, most of the inexperienced and 1-3-year experienced companies preferred offering 
stress management and smoking cessation programs; and most of the more than 4-year 
experienced companies preferred offering stress management programs and biometric 
screening. 
The descriptive statistics show that some programs were preferred regardless of 
the objectives of WWPs. The WWP choices are likely to depend on the perceptions of 
employers and WWP vendors such as insurance companies. This subsection provides a 
quick insight on what we expect from the data. In the next section, we analyze the 
association between the program choice and reasons for implementing WWPs using an 





One of the shortcomings of the economic evaluation literature of WWPs is the 
lack of any connection between implementing WWPs and the organizations’ objectives. 
The evaluations have been executed from employer’s perspective. Hence, profit-
maximizing motives, cost savings and ROI, have been assumed as the primary reasons 
for WWP implementation. The theoretical model in this paper shifts the focus in two 
ways. First, it shifts from profit maximizing motives to an overall objective function of an 
organization that has profit and other components that are not necessarily profit related. 
Second, it shifts from returns or cost savings as the primary reason to other potential 
reasons, such as employee morale, retention, and employee request. 
This section sets up the optimization problem of a representative firm that chooses 
WWPs to achieve organizational objectives. For simplicity, we assumed that there are 
three reasons for WWP implementation (R) and two WWPs (x𝜖 { 1 2,x x }) that the firm 
can choose to implement to achieve its objectives. Reasons for WWP implementation are 
savings from health care and productivity- related costs (S), improving employee health 
(H), and improving employee morale (M). 1x  and 2x represent the two unspecified 
WWPs that a firm can chose between. 
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The program choice is assumed to attain the reason for program implementation. 














The decision-making process for an organization depends on its objective 
function, which is the utility function (u) of a firm. We use a random utility model to 
establish a functional relationship between program options, implementation reasons, and 
organizations’ characteristics. The objective function has a systematic utility (𝑉), and a 
random residual (e). The systematic utility is the perceived mean utility and the random 
residual is the unknown deviation from the perceived utility (Train, 1986; Cascetta, 
2009). The systematic utility is a function of profit ( ) and other utility components ( ) 
that are not profit related. 
 
( , )u V e    (3.2) 
 
 
The profit component, which is standard from economic theory, is the difference 
between total revenue and total cost. Total revenue is calculated as price (p) times 
production (Y). Total cost is determined with cost function (C). 
 
pY C    (3.3) 
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Production is the function of labor input (L), because WWPs impact only labor 
input in the production process. In this model, labor is a function of employee health 
where better health increases labor productivity. 
 
( )Y f L  (3.4) 
 
 
( )L L H  (3.5) 
 
 
Cost function includes labor cost, workers’ compensation claims, and program 
cost. Wages (w), health care benefits (b), and sick days (d) determine the labor cost. The 
labor cost is the sum of health care benefits (bwL), cost of lost days (absenteeism) (dwL), 
and cost of presenteeism ( wL ). If there is no productivity loss due to presenteeism, then 
 =1 and the cost is wL. If there is loss due to presenteeism, then  >1 and the cost is 
wL . Worker’s compensation claims (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝) are the cost of work-related injuries. If any 
program is chosen given the reason for program implementation, represented by the 
indicator function (I(x|R)), then the cost function includes program costs ( xpc ). 
 




The utility components that are not profit related ( ) create a corporate 
citizenship value for organizations to achieve firm’s goals (Peredo and McLean, 2006). 
Employee health and employee morale both affect this component, which is the 
additional piece to the classical firm theory of profit maximizing objectives. Including 
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this component helps us to identify different motivations of for-profit, not-for profit, and 
nonprofit companies. 
 
( , )H M   (3.7) 
 
 
Savings from health care benefit payments, presenteeism, absenteeism, or injuries 
affect firm’s objective function through profit. Improving employee morale affects 
objective function through the utility component other than profit. In addition, improving 
employee health affects the objective function through both the profit and the other utility 
components. Enhanced employee performance is expected through improved labor 
productivity, presenteeism, and absenteeism.  
The utility component that is not profit ( ) has a direct impact on the objective 
function. There are two reasons for implementation that could affect this component: 
improving employee morale and health. Employee health can affect the model in 
different ways depending on the employers’ motives. Employee health enters the firm’s 
utility through multiple mechanisms. The first mechanism is the impact of employee 
health on productivity shown in equations (3.4) and (3.5). The second mechanism is on 
cost via absenteeism, health care benefits, and workers’ compensation claims shown in 
equation (3.6). The third mechanism is the impact of employee health on   shown in 
equation (3.7) 
Suppose that the objective function has the following linear form with parameters 
  and   that are organization’s weight on profit and other utility components: 
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u e     (3.8) 
 
 
An organization maximizes its utility with respect to labor input and WWP 
choices: 
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We plug equations (3.1) and (3.3)–(3.6) into equation (3.8) and maximize it with 
respect to labor input and program choices. One of the primary objectives of the model is 
to analyze how reasons for WWP implementation links to program choice given the 
company characteristics using economic theory. Implicit function theorem allows us to 
obtain implied demand functions for WWP options that are functions of reasons and 
company characteristics. This paper does not solve the theoretical model for the choice 
variables explicitly. The first order conditions to the optimization problem and other 
relevant information to the model are provided in the Appendix 3.A. Estimation strategy 
for program choices is explained in the empirical model section. 
The model has important assumptions for simplification. Each reason for 
implementation could have an indirect influence on the other reason. Improving 
employee morale could influence employee health and presenteeism. Improving 
employee health could influence health care utilization, presenteeism, absenteeism, and 
morale. The first assumption is that the reasons are independent from each other due to 
prioritizing primary reason for WWP implementation. In addition, once an organization 
chooses the reason, it implements the relevant program to achieve its organizational 
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objectives. The second assumption is that organizations offer the most effective WWPs 
based on their reason for program implementation to maximize their objective function. 
Empirical Model 
In practice, organizations might not achieve their stated objectives. As noted in 
the theoretical model section, the model assumes that organizations offer the most 
effective WWPs based on their reason for program implementation to maximize their 
objective function. However, the real-world practices have shown that this assumption 
fails and, in most cases, there is no effective association between reason for WWP 
implementation and the offered program. This issue reduces the reliability of WWPs as 
policy tools. The empirical model examines employers’ perception on the 
implementation reasons and WWPs. This set up allows us to explore the disconnection 
between the business practices and evaluation literature. 
The model estimates whether implementation reasons and organizational 
characteristics, such as WWP experience, industry, organization size and year of entry 
significantly influences choosing certain WWPs. The first step is to look to at the 
estimations for each program: 
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(3.12) 
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We first estimated the single choice probabilities of an organization choosing 
each program at a given time and the measured characteristics of observations using the 
probit model. Each program choice, j ∈ {1, 2 ,…, 15} is a function of ijX  that includes 
adoption reasons, organizational characteristics (company size, and industry) and dummy 
for checklist entry year of 2011 and after. Each error term, ij , is distributed as standard 
normal with zero mean and variance one. 
Each WWP option of j for organization i ( ijWWP ) is a binary variable that takes 
on a value one if an organization chooses to implement it, and zero otherwise. 
Organizations can choose from the following WWP options: not to offer any program (no 
WWP), or to offer programs including (1) health risk appraisals, (2) health screenings, (3) 
physical activity, (4) smoking cessation, (5) nutrition and weight management, (6) 
alcohol consumption, (7) stress management, (8) medical self-care, (9) work and family, 
(10) personal financial management, (11) health and safety protection, (12) ergonomics, 
(13) mental health and depression, or (14) disease management. 
Reason for WWP implementation ( ijreason ) is a binary variable that takes on a 
value one if organization chooses it, and zero otherwise. Organizations choose their top 
two reasons for adoption, which were not ranked. The reasons were listed as (1) improve 
employee health, (2) improve health of spouses and dependents, (3) increase employee 
responsibility for managing personal health, (4) contain health care costs, (5) produce a 
return on investment, (6) reduce unnecessary medical care utilization, (7) improve work 
performance (reduce presenteeism, enhance productivity, or reduce absenteeism), (9) 
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retention ( meet employees’ requests or attract and retain employees), and (10) improve 
employee morale. The grouping accounted for the relevancy among the grouped reasons. 
Furthermore, improving retiree health was excluded from the repressors because of small 
sample size issue.  
Sector ( isector ) is another variable that potentially affects the WWP options due 
to the relevant regulations and responsibilities. There are two binary variables that were 
used in the estimations: manufacturing and services. The other categories were 
considered the base category. We chose these two categories for sectors because they had 
the highest two subsample sizes. Company size ( ismall ), whether it is small or not 
impacts the resourced available and needs for WWP. 
The year variable in the checklist is the first year that companies filled out the 
checklist. We used a dummy variable that is one if the checklist year was 2011 and after. 
We picked dummy for 2011 ( id2011 ) to account for the ACA effect on the reason for 
WWP implementation and the WWP choice. 
Univariate probit estimations considers all the program choices independent from 
each other. In the data, we observe that companies chose more than one program to offer. 
Equation-by-equation estimations impose zero restriction on coefficients of other 
equations. We also estimate the choice probabilities using the multivariate probit (MP) 
model to estimate joint probabilities of choosing more than one program. Acknowledging 
the potential covariance between program choices improves efficiency of the coefficient 
estimates (Zellner, 1962; Zellner and Huang, 1962). Error terms, ij , are distributed as 
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multivariate normal with zero means and variance matrix where the diagonal (variance) 
takes on a value of one and off diagonal (covariance) takes on a value of kj  for 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘. 
Stata Statistical Software (Release 14) is used to estimate the MP model. The 
model estimated the following log likelihood function with twenty draws using a sample 
of N-independent observations (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003): 
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where 14 (.) is the multivariate normal cumulative distribution for 14 dependent 
variables (reasons for adoption) with mean i  and variance-covariance matrix  . We 
found that the estimated correlations between error terms are statistically significant and 
demonstrate the strong relation of these equations. Thus, we provided estimates of the 
MP model that allows firms to pick multiple programs and eliminates cross-equation 
restrictions. 
As shown in the Data section, we observe shifts in reasons for WWP 
implementation that differed based on WWP experience. Although industry and size 
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influence the decision-making process for WWP implementation, we did not observe 
shifts in reasons for WWP implementation trends based on industry and size. Thus, 
regressions were run separately for experience levels and each regression we control for 
industry and size. Also, we cannot add interaction terms of reasons for WWP 
implementation and experience levels due to the number of right hand side variables that 
the multivariate probit can handle. 
Results 
Tables 3.4-3.6 presents the results for the empirical model. Table 3.4 presents the 
results for inexperienced companies. If the reason for WWP adoption was to improve 
health of dependents and spouses or to improve employee morale, companies were more 
likely to implement personal financial management programs. If the reason was to 
increase responsibility in managing personal health, then companies were more likely to 
offer health screenings or implement work family or personal financial management 
programs. Lastly, if the reason was containing health care costs, companies were more 
likely to offer health screenings. Companies in the service industry were less likely to 
adopt health/safety protection programs, while companies in manufacturing industry were 
more likely to adopt smoking cessation, health/safety protection, or ergonomics 
programs. Small companies were always less likely to adopt any type of wellness 
program. 
Table 3.5 presents the results for companies with 1-3 years of experience 
companies. If the reason for WWP implementation was improving employee health, 
improving health of dependents and spouses, containing health care costs, producing 
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ROI, or improving work performance, companies were more likely to implement 
smoking cessation programs and less likely to implement ergonomics programs. If the 
reason was increasing responsibility for managing personal health, reducing medical care 
utilization, or improving employee morale, companies were less likely to implement 
ergonomics programs. If the reason was retention and employee request, companies were 
more likely to implement smoking cessation programs. Companies in the service industry 
were more likely to implement ergonomics programs, and less likely to implement 
physical activity, nutrition/weight management, and health/safety protection programs. In 
comparison, companies in the manufacturing industry were more likely to implement 
nutrition/weight management, health/safety protection, or ergonomics programs, and less 
likely to implement physical activity, stress management, and work family programs. 
Again, Small companies were always less likely to implement any wellness program. 
Table 3.6 shows the results for companies with more than 3 years of experience 
companies. If the reason for WWP implementation was improving employee health, 
increasing responsibility for managing personal health, containing health care costs, or 
retention, companies were more likely to implement physical activity programs, and less 
likely to implement stress management programs. If the reason was to improve health of 
dependents and spouses, then companies were more likely to offer HRA and biometric 
screening and implement physical activity, smoking cessation, responsible alcohol use, 
ergonomics, and disease management programs. If the reason was to produce ROI, 
companies were more likely to offer HRA and implement physical activity programs, and 
less likely to implement stress management programs. If the reason was to reduce health 
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care utilization, companies implemented less stress management programs. If the reason 
was to improve employee morale, companies were more likely to implement physical 
activity programs. Companies in service industry were more likely to implement stress 
management and mental health/depression programs, and less likely to implement disease 
management programs. However, companies in manufacturing industry were more likely 
to implement smoking cessation or health/safety protection programs. As before, small 
companies were always less likely to implement any wellness program. 
Significance of coefficients do not change much between univariate and 
multivariate regressions for inexperienced sample, and for size, industry, and year 
dummy variables in all subsamples. However, allowing correlation between equations 
improves efficiency of estimates for experienced samples. In 1-3-year experienced 
sample, we observe trends in ergonomics with multivariate regressions but not with 
univariate regressions. Similarly, in more than 3-year experienced sample we observe 
trends in stress management with multivariate regressions but not with univariate 
regressions. (Appendix 3.B1-3.B3). All pairwise correlations between equations in 
multivariate regressions are significant. 
The results show that companies that have more than 3 years of experience prefer 
more physical activity programs and less stress management programs with most of the 
reason for WWP implementation. In addition, companies with 1-3-years of experience 
prefer more smoking cessation and less ergonomics programs with most of the reasons. 
The inexperienced sample does not have a clear pattern with choice of WWPs. Company 
characteristics show similar patterns across all experience levels. Small companies are 
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always less likely to implement WWPs. Companies in the service industry are less likely 
to implement health/safety protection programs. Companies in the manufacturing 
industry are more likely to implement health/safety protection and ergonomics programs. 
Nutrition/weight management programs, HRAs, and biometric screenings seemed to be 
the most popular programs in the descriptive statistics (Figures 3.5-3.8). Nevertheless, we 
no longer find that pattern when we control for all the reasons for implementation with 
company characteristics and allow for correlation between program choices in the 
regressions. 
Our findings provide significant evidence that there are clear trends for WWP 
choices based on the experience and company characteristics, but that there is a 
disconnect between reasons for program implementation and program choice, especially 
with less experienced companies. Something important to note is that companies with 1-3 
years of WWP experience implemented certain programs regardless of the program 
objective. Moreover, ROI is not necessarily the main value of WWPs to companies and 
the current state of the literature does not align the evaluation metric with true company 
values. 
Discussion 
Economic evaluations on WWPs have mainly focused on ROI analysis. These 
analyses demonstrate that WWPs could help companies receive financial savings through 
reduced health care costs and improved labor productivity. Most studies that evaluated 
WWPs did not provide information on the reasons for why companies would implement 
these programs other than ROI or cost savings. Although the success criteria for WWPs 
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need to be linked to businesses’ strategies to provide valid and reliable evaluations, there 
are no theoretical or empirical studies on companies’ decisions to adopt WWPs. 
The findings of this paper show that inexperienced companies did not have a 
strategy on how to utilize WWPs to achieve their objectives. As the experience for WWP 
implementation grows over 1-3 years, companies were more likely to choose smoking 
cessations programs. Employers chose smoking cessation programs to achieve health 
improvements, cost savings, or other objectives because health insurance providers offer 
those programs. These companies were less likely to implement ergonomics programs. 
Most insurance companies offer smoking cessation programs for free (no cost on 
employers). Preferences of insurance companies might be the main reason of these 
trends. In addition, companies might already have satisfied the regulations relevant to 
ergonomics and there was no need for ergonomics programs. As the experience for WWP 
implementation increases to more than 3 years, companies were more likely to implement 
physical activity programs. Employers chose physical activity programs also to achieve 
certain health improvements, cost savings, or other objectives. These companies were 
less likely to choose stress management programs. As experience with WWPs increases, 
companies might prefer more complex programs. That might be why we observe a shift 
from smoking cessation (for 1-3 years of experience) to physical activity programs (for 
more than 3 years of experience). Moreover, companies with the most experience might 
want tangible results which are relatively easier to evaluate. That might be the reason for 
offering physical activity programs but not stress management programs. 
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Companies often work with the insurance providers for WWPs implementation. 
Looking at these patterns, it seems that companies may follow the WWP trends that 
health insurance companies and wellness program vendors provide. This is suggested by 
the lack of association between objectives for WWP implementation and program choice. 
When health insurance providers offer WWPs, they usually present descriptive 
information on participation and certain health information. Suppose the objective for 
implementing WWPs is improving employee morale and physical activity is offered to 
achieve the employers’ objective. Then, employers should have data collection that 
suggests that their employees want physical activity programs and evaluate the effect of 
these programs on morale. Outside vendors or insurance companies may only measure 
what is important to them, not the employers. Therefore, even if there is strong public 
policy support, desired outcomes may not be achieved due to missing connections. 
Research that examines the relationship between value propositions of and programs 
provided by vendors or insurers may help to identify misalignments in value propositions 
and help companies choose programs that may be more likely to meet their objectives. 
There are four limitations relevant to this study. First, the checklist is self-reported 
where the data is subject to measurement errors. Second, the position of the respondent 
who completed the checklist on behalf of the organization could influence responses, 
particularly for value propositions of WWPs. For instance, managers and employee-
wellness team might have different reasons for WWP implementation. Although future 
research can analyze these differences in perceptions by looking at variations in value 
propositions across different levels of employees and employers in organizations, it is not 
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the focus if this paper. Third, there may be recall bias in responses, especially for 
checklist questions on WWPs which asked whether the organization implemented that 
WWP in the last 12 months. Last, the checklist asked for the top two reasons for WWP 
implementation in no particular ranked order. Although this question gives more detail 
than asking to choose all that apply, we still cannot identify the top reason that could 
affect the regression results in the model. 
Although there are limitations, this research offers a new perspective on how to 
improve successful adoption and assessment of wellness programs in workplaces with 
different company characteristic. The economic evaluations have presented ROI as the 
targeted outcome of WWPs. Although information on returns show the use of resources 
from a business perspective, the success of a WWP to achieve certain objectives cannot 
be tied to this narrow perspective. This is the first and so far only study that evaluates 
value propositions from the economics perspective and models the firms’ behavior when 




























































Figure 3.5. Frequenies for the HRA, Health Screening, and Most Offered Wellness Programs by Experience: 











Figure 3.6. Frequenies for the HRA, Health Screening, and Most Offered Wellness Programs by Experience: 











Figure 3.7. Frequenies for the HRA, Health Screening, and Most Offered Wellness Programs by Experience: 










Figure 3.8. Frequenies for the HRA, Health Screening, and Most Offered Wellness Programs by Experience: 









Table 3.1. Frequencies for How Long Wellness Programs Had Been in Place 
 
Experience in implementing wellness program  Frequency Percentage 
Program has just been in place 1102 29.82 
Program has been in place for 1-3 years 1306 35.35 






Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables 
 
                         (1)       (2)       (3)       (4)    
                      Full 






Reasons for WWP Adoption     
Improve employee health  0.678     0.665     0.678     0.688    
                      (0.467)    (0.472)    (0.467)    (0.464)    
Improve the health of 
employees' 
 0.113     0.080     0.111     0.144    
spouses and dependents (0.317)    (0.271)    (0.314)    (0.351)    
Increase employee 
responsibility 
 0.182     0.164     0.205     0.174    
for managing personal health (0.386)    (0.371)    (0.404)    (0.379)    
Contain health care costs  0.586     0.525     0.624     0.601    
                      (0.493)    (0.500)    (0.485)    (0.490)    
Produce ROI            0.044     0.054     0.047     0.033    
                      (0.206)    (0.227)    (0.211)    (0.180)    
Reduce unnecessary medical  0.064     0.074     0.056     0.063    
care utilization (0.244)    (0.261)    (0.230)    (0.243)    
Improve performance or  0.075     0.101     0.062     0.067    
productivity (0.264)    (0.301)    (0.241)    (0.250)    
Reduce absenteeism     0.026     0.044     0.018     0.018    
                      (0.159)    (0.206)    (0.134)    (0.133)    
Employee request or retention  0.106     0.113     0.090     0.117    
                      (0.308)    (0.316)    (0.287)    (0.321)    
Improve employee morale  0.113     0.163     0.100     0.084    
                      (0.317)    (0.370)    (0.300)    (0.277)    
Company Characteristics     
Industry: Services     0.499     0.545     0.499     0.458    
                      (0.500)    (0.498)    (0.500)    (0.498)    
Industry: Manufacturing  0.154     0.145     0.157     0.159    
                      (0.361)    (0.352)    (0.364)    (0.365)    
Industry: All other industries  0.347     0.309     0.344     0.383    
                      (0.476)    (0.462)    (0.475)    (0.486)    
Size: Small                0.572     0.710     0.565     0.462    
                      (0.495)    (0.454)    (0.496)    (0.499)    
First time entry in checklist  0.523     0.582     0.483     0.514    
(2011 and after) (0.500)    (0.494)    (0.500)    (0.500)    





Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 
 
                         (1)       (2)       (3)       (4)    
                      Full 








WWPs     
Health risk appraisals  0.669     0.411     0.761     0.797    
                      (0.471)    (0.492)    (0.427)    (0.402)    
Health screening       0.697     0.425     0.771     0.855    
                      (0.460)    (0.495)    (0.420)    (0.352)    
Physical activity      0.835     0.575     0.938     0.954    
                      (0.371)    (0.495)    (0.241)    (0.209)    
Smoking cessation      0.673     0.447     0.732     0.805    
                      (0.469)    (0.497)    (0.443)    (0.396)    
Nutrition/weight Management  0.821     0.549     0.931     0.942    
                      (0.384)    (0.498)    (0.253)    (0.234)    
Responsible alcohol use  0.355     0.206     0.380     0.457    
                      (0.479)    (0.405)    (0.486)    (0.498)    
Stress management      0.701     0.422     0.786     0.855    
                      (0.458)    (0.494)    (0.411)    (0.353)    
Medical self-care      0.490     0.265     0.523     0.650    
                      (0.500)    (0.442)    (0.500)    (0.477)    
Work family            0.432     0.235     0.467     0.564    
                      (0.495)    (0.424)    (0.499)    (0.496)    
Personal financial management  0.524     0.340     0.543     0.663    
                      (0.499)    (0.474)    (0.498)    (0.473)    
Safety/health protection  0.705     0.535     0.733     0.822    
                      (0.456)    (0.499)    (0.443)    (0.383)    
Ergonomics             0.481     0.319     0.505     0.598    
                      (0.500)    (0.466)    (0.500)    (0.491)    
Mental health/depression  0.549     0.311     0.595     0.707    
                      (0.498)    (0.463)    (0.491)    (0.455)    
Disease management     0.621     0.366     0.688     0.772    
                      (0.485)    (0.482)    (0.463)    (0.419)    









Table 3.4. Multivariate Probit Results on Inexperienced Sample 
 
Companies with no experience in 
















Improve employee  -0.252 0.095 0.271 -0.061 0.236 0.284 0.204 
health (0.244) (0.262) (0.265) (0.269) (0.254) (0.291) (0.272) 
Improve the health of -0.164 0.111 0.207 0.010 0.331 0.455 0.264 
spouses and dependents (0.274) (0.293) (0.299) (0.299) (0.290) (0.327) (0.305) 
Increase responsibility 0.057 0.590** 0.264 -0.005 0.310 0.410 0.344 
for managing personal health (0.254) (0.271) (0.277) (0.280) (0.266) (0.303) (0.283) 
Contain health care  0.169 0.478* 0.227 0.085 0.126 0.346 0.388 
costs (0.243) (0.261) (0.268) (0.272) (0.257) (0.293) (0.275) 
Produce ROI -0.024 0.368 0.170 -0.336 0.032 0.102 0.186  
(0.289) (0.305) (0.303) (0.313) (0.291) (0.339) (0.314) 
Reduce unnecessary  -0.289 -0.013 -0.193 -0.254 -0.263 0.103 0.013 
medical care utilization (0.276) (0.290) (0.296) (0.303) (0.282) (0.327) (0.300) 
Improve performance or -0.433 0.002 0.044 -0.197 -0.085 0.340 0.224 
Productivity or reduce absenteeism (0.291) (0.302) (0.308) (0.315) (0.300) (0.340) (0.313) 
Retention or employee -0.334 0.193 0.348 -0.123 0.083 0.156 0.485 
request (0.272) (0.286) (0.296) (0.298) (0.282) (0.318) (0.301) 
Improve employee  -0.258 0.171 0.179 -0.049 0.161 0.292 0.341 
morale (0.255) (0.273) (0.277) (0.283) (0.269) (0.304) (0.283) 
Industry: Services -0.051 -0.080 0.018 0.083 0.012 -0.123 0.047  
(0.088) (0.089) (0.087) (0.088) (0.086) (0.095) (0.084) 
Industry: Manufacturing -0.032 0.092 -0.100 0.382*** 0.105 0.142 -0.053  
(0.122) (0.120) (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) (0.131) (0.118) 
Small company -0.217** -0.343*** -0.205** -0.541*** -0.337*** -0.164* -0.213***  
(0.087) (0.086) (0.084) (0.086) (0.084) (0.092) (0.082) 
The first year of entry 0.018 -0.050 -0.130* -0.055 -0.062 -0.026 -0.045 
to the Checklist: 2011 and after (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.086) (0.076) 
Constant 0.185 -0.376 -0.025 0.260 0.056 -1.247** -0.613  
(0.478) (0.511) (0.526) (0.535) (0.504) (0.578) (0.539) 







Table 3.4. Multivariate Probit Results on Inexperienced Sample (Continued) 
 
Companies with no experience in 















Improve employee  0.016 0.142 0.318 0.221 0.022 -0.140 -0.018 
health (0.280) (0.298) (0.275) (0.261) (0.271) (0.267) (0.277) 
Improve the health of 0.229 0.299 0.500* 0.279 0.015 0.094 0.173 
spouses and dependents (0.313) (0.332) (0.303) (0.292) (0.303) (0.298) (0.307) 
Increase responsibility 0.335 0.535* 0.644** 0.377 -0.021 0.171 0.267 
for managing personal health (0.293) (0.308) (0.284) (0.272) (0.282) (0.279) (0.287) 
Contain health care  0.211 0.355 0.423 0.342 -0.090 0.038 0.071 
costs (0.284) (0.298) (0.275) (0.263) (0.274) (0.269) (0.278) 
Produce ROI 0.030 0.217 0.433 0.200 -0.012 -0.141 0.094  
(0.322) (0.341) (0.315) (0.304) (0.317) (0.305) (0.312) 
Reduce unnecessary  -0.202 0.018 -0.075 0.132 -0.263 -0.206 -0.183 
medical care utilization (0.318) (0.330) (0.311) (0.289) (0.302) (0.300) (0.306) 
Improve performance or 0.112 0.322 0.293 0.266 -0.140 -0.094 -0.049 
Productivity or reduce absenteeism (0.329) (0.333) (0.317) (0.306) (0.320) (0.313) (0.315) 
Retention or employee 0.246 0.422 0.386 0.144 -0.254 0.045 0.107 
request (0.312) (0.323) (0.293) (0.286) (0.304) (0.294) (0.304) 
Improve employee  0.176 0.349 0.485* 0.285 -0.062 -0.201 -0.002 
morale (0.296) (0.309) (0.286) (0.274) (0.285) (0.284) (0.291) 
Industry: Services -0.024 -0.004 -0.006 -0.153* 0.121 0.053 0.021  
(0.091) (0.092) (0.089) (0.085) (0.092) (0.090) (0.087) 
Industry: Manufacturing 0.124 0.013 -0.054 0.518*** 0.680*** -0.008 0.057  
(0.126) (0.130) (0.124) (0.123) (0.123) (0.125) (0.122) 
Small company -0.115 -0.208** -0.199** -0.069 -0.126 -0.301*** -0.323***  
(0.087) (0.088) (0.085) (0.085) (0.089) (0.085) (0.084) 
The first year of entry -0.116 -0.047 -0.079 -0.104 -0.188** -0.143* -0.070 
to the Checklist: 2011 and after (0.081) (0.082) (0.079) (0.078) (0.081) (0.081) (0.078) 
Constant -0.733 -1.102 -0.984* -0.328 -0.344 -0.133 -0.178  
(0.558) (0.592) (0.541) (0.517) (0.538) (0.530) (0.549) 







Table 3.5. Multivariate Probit Results on 1-3-Year Experienced Sample 
 
Companies with 1-3-year experience 
















Improve employee  -0.226 -0.047 -0.197 0.642* 0.025 -0.005 -0.622 
health (0.416) (0.425) (0.699) (0.385) (0.523) (0.423) (0.498) 
Improve the health of -0.032 -0.010 -0.132 0.691* -0.035 0.124 -0.438 
spouses and dependents (0.435) (0.441) (0.719) (0.403) (0.545) (0.437) (0.509) 
Increase responsibility -0.095 -0.103 -0.239 0.419 0.043 -0.009 -0.644 
for managing personal health (0.421) (0.429) (0.700) (0.390) (0.530) (0.427) (0.500) 
Contain health care  0.181 0.016 -0.291 0.720* 0.117 0.081 -0.448 
costs (0.421) (0.428) (0.693) (0.389) (0.525) (0.425) (0.497) 
Produce ROI 0.138 0.189 -0.105 0.996** 0.127 0.225 -0.393  
(0.455) (0.460) (0.738) (0.427) (0.569) (0.450) (0.529) 
Reduce unnecessary  0.023 -0.107 -0.575 0.595 -0.123 0.055 -0.689 
medical care utilization (0.445) (0.450) (0.719) (0.417) (0.564) (0.447) (0.519) 
Improve performance or -0.371 -0.316 -0.534 0.750* -0.364 0.163 -0.464 
Productivity or reduce absenteeism (0.436) (0.445) (0.731) (0.417) (0.550) (0.447) (0.513) 
Retention or employee -0.115 -0.159 -0.144 0.826** 0.308 0.066 -0.407 
request (0.443) (0.448) (0.744) (0.418) (0.578) (0.448) (0.527) 
Improve employee  -0.371 -0.400 -0.038 0.511 0.117 0.122 -0.447 
morale (0.430) (0.438) (0.714) (0.399) (0.542) (0.436) (0.505) 
Industry: Services -0.118 -0.057 -0.204* 0.052 -0.283** -0.065 -0.106  
(0.086) (0.085) (0.123) (0.083) (0.117) (0.079) (0.086) 
Industry: Manufacturing 0.109 0.020 -0.418*** 0.349*** -0.220 0.153 -0.320***  
(0.120) (0.120) (0.153) (0.117) (0.158) (0.105) (0.114) 
Small company -0.260*** -0.149* -0.088 -0.391*** -0.244** -0.067 -0.234***  
(0.079) (0.078) (0.104) (0.078) (0.104) (0.072) (0.079) 
The first year of entry 0.021 -0.141* 0.067 -0.094 -0.101 -0.181** -0.103 
to the Checklist: 2011 and after (0.077) (0.077) (0.104) (0.076) (0.102) (0.071) (0.076) 
Constant 1.049 1.057 2.244 -0.483 1.787 -0.273 2.146**  
(0.827) (0.843) (1.387) (0.766) (1.038) (0.843) (0.990) 







Table 3.5. Multivariate Probit Results on 1-3-Year Experienced Sample (Continued) 
 
Companies with 1-3-year experience 















Improve employee  -0.690 -0.043 -0.317 -0.464 -1.011*** -0.273 -0.391 
health (0.483) (0.406) (0.411) (0.439) (0.390) (0.409) (0.429) 
Improve the health of -0.299 0.373 -0.019 -0.354 -0.919** 0.085 -0.041 
spouses and dependents (0.495) (0.423) (0.427) (0.453) (0.403) (0.424) (0.442) 
Increase responsibility -0.658 -0.182 -0.412 -0.449 -0.986** -0.291 -0.364 
for managing personal health (0.487) (0.411) (0.415) (0.442) (0.395) (0.413) (0.434) 
Contain health care  -0.576 -0.030 -0.293 -0.314 -0.942** -0.130 -0.250 
costs (0.485) (0.409) (0.414) (0.437) (0.397) (0.411) (0.432) 
Produce ROI -0.461 0.119 -0.272 -0.263 -0.791* -0.094 -0.182  
(0.507) (0.435) (0.438) (0.467) (0.421) (0.433) (0.462) 
Reduce unnecessary  -0.723 -0.238 -0.407 -0.424 -1.044** -0.043 -0.251 
medical care utilization (0.503) (0.434) (0.436) (0.465) (0.417) (0.437) (0.454) 
Improve performance or -0.630 0.047 -0.265 -0.107 -0.806* -0.240 -0.145 
Productivity or reduce absenteeism (0.504) (0.431) (0.437) (0.472) (0.417) (0.434) (0.453) 
Retention or employee -0.648 0.136 -0.190 -0.446 -0.468 0.113 -0.239 
request (0.507) (0.431) (0.435) (0.460) (0.411) (0.436) (0.453) 
Improve employee  -0.561 0.104 -0.298 -0.346 -0.920** -0.027 -0.389 
morale (0.493) (0.418) (0.423) (0.448) (0.405) (0.422) (0.440) 
Industry: Services -0.118 -0.092 -0.020 -0.177** 0.149* -0.067 -0.073  
(0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.082) (0.078) (0.079) (0.082) 
Industry: Manufacturing -0.068 -0.191* -0.170 0.307** 0.439*** -0.109 0.005  
(0.106) (0.109) (0.108) (0.122) (0.107) (0.108) (0.111) 
Small company 0.008 -0.303*** -0.237*** -0.126* -0.135 -0.324*** -0.479***  
(0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.076) (0.072) (0.073) (0.076) 
The first year of entry -0.190*** -0.165** -0.066 -0.092 -0.096 -0.158** -0.096 
to the Checklist: 2011 and after (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.074) (0.070) (0.071) (0.073) 
Constant 1.444 0.280 0.898 1.557* 1.869** 0.901 1.461*  
(0.964) (0.811) (0.819) (0.871) (0.777) (0.814) (0.852) 







Table 3.6. Multivariate Probit Results on More Than 3-Year Experienced Sample 
 
Companies with more than 3-
year experience in wellness 
















Improve employee  0.347 0.370 1.115*** 0.370 0.333 0.269 -0.812** 
health (0.325) (0.319) (0.368) (0.321) (0.392) (0.285) (0.414) 
Improve the health of 0.694** 0.867** 1.000** 0.888** 0.202 0.613** -0.611 
spouses and dependents (0.347) (0.359) (0.393) (0.351) (0.407) (0.301) (0.427) 
Increase responsibility 0.388 0.353 0.887** 0.468 0.118 0.232 -0.794* 
for managing personal health (0.332) (0.331) (0.363) (0.329) (0.397) (0.292) (0.421) 
Contain health care  0.598 0.341 0.679* 0.341 0.253 0.074 -0.867** 
costs (0.325) (0.324) (0.354) (0.323) (0.379) (0.287) (0.420) 
Produce ROI 0.359* 0.170 0.920* 0.367 -0.110 -0.142 -1.082**  
(0.388) (0.389) (0.482) (0.389) (0.464) (0.342) (0.464) 
Reduce unnecessary  0.442 0.559 0.600 0.399 -0.129 -0.031 -0.965** 
medical care utilization (0.357) (0.361) (0.393) (0.355) (0.420) (0.315) (0.443) 
Improve performance or 0.185 0.216 0.610 0.565 0.178 0.473 -0.694 
Productivity or reduce absenteeism (0.364) (0.362) (0.413) (0.361) (0.436) (0.321) (0.436) 
Retention or employee 0.304 0.363 1.164** 0.411 0.009 0.109 -0.919** 
request (0.352) (0.352) (0.468) (0.360) (0.447) (0.322) (0.452) 
Improve employee  -0.029 -0.046 0.666* 0.187 0.300 0.002 -0.610 
morale (0.343) (0.343) (0.374) (0.343) (0.415) (0.307) (0.441) 
Industry: Services -0.049 -0.015 0.083 0.104 0.099 -0.073 0.190**  
(0.090) (0.094) (0.127) (0.087) (0.117) (0.078) (0.093) 
Industry: Manufacturing 0.101 0.140 -0.207 0.393*** 0.275 0.050 0.032  
(0.125) (0.134) (0.152) (0.130) (0.181) (0.104) (0.122) 
Small company -0.186** -0.252*** -0.291** -0.556*** -0.368*** -0.169** -0.326***  
(0.081) (0.089) (0.114) (0.082) (0.110) (0.072) (0.087) 
The first year of entry -0.004 -0.030 0.012 0.103 0.045 -0.123* -0.071 
to the Checklist: 2011 and after (0.081) (0.087) (0.117) (0.082) (0.103) (0.071) (0.083) 
Constant 0.102 0.475 0.081 0.193 1.187 -0.355 2.773***  
(0.639) (0.630) (0.700) (0.633) (0.756) (0.562) (0.821) 







Table 3.6. Multivariate Probit Results on More Than 3-Year Experienced Sample (Continued) 
 
Companies with more than 3-year 
experience in wellness programs 















Improve employee  0.165 -0.083 -0.187 0.200 0.323 -0.185 0.234 
health (0.289) (0.277) (0.302) (0.318) (0.286) (0.290) (0.313) 
Improve the health of 0.448 0.275 -0.086 0.540 0.603** 0.157 0.639** 
spouses and dependents (0.308) (0.294) (0.313) (0.338) (0.304) (0.308) (0.321) 
Increase responsibility 0.275 0.052 -0.113 0.380 0.460 -0.059 0.190 
for managing personal health (0.296) (0.283) (0.311) (0.324) (0.293) (0.296) (0.323) 
Contain health care  0.037 -0.022 -0.170 0.124 0.226 -0.167 0.077 
costs (0.289) (0.275) (0.305) (0.315) (0.286) (0.291) (0.318) 
Produce ROI -0.296 -0.088 -0.351 0.034 0.153 -0.332 0.107  
(0.340) (0.338) (0.357) (0.373) (0.343) (0.344) (0.372) 
Reduce unnecessary  0.065 -0.273 -0.430 0.169 0.312 0.018 0.243 
medical care utilization (0.316) (0.304) (0.330) (0.341) (0.314) (0.325) (0.349) 
Improve performance or 0.312 0.146 -0.122 0.411 0.675** -0.010 0.088 
Productivity or reduce absenteeism (0.330) (0.310) (0.339) (0.358) (0.327) (0.330) (0.365) 
Retention or employee 0.146 0.057 -0.158 0.261 0.450 -0.043 0.045 
request (0.325) (0.313) (0.337) (0.352) (0.319) (0.330) (0.353) 
Improve employee  -0.135 -0.111 -0.183 0.085 0.172 -0.465 -0.015 
morale (0.308) (0.295) (0.324) (0.336) (0.308) (0.312) (0.337) 
Industry: Services -0.056 0.011 0.047 -0.069 0.011 0.217*** -0.178**  
(0.081) (0.079) (0.081) (0.089) (0.080) (0.082) (0.084) 
Industry: Manufacturing -0.011 -0.078 0.033 0.410*** 0.060 0.033 0.044  
(0.106) (0.105) (0.108) (0.133) (0.105) (0.111) (0.121) 
Small company -0.195** -0.413*** -0.319*** -0.205** -0.267*** -0.372*** -0.485***  
(0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.083) (0.074) (0.077) (0.079) 
The first year of entry -0.055 0.095 0.059 -0.317*** -0.041 0.067 -0.011 
to the Checklist: 2011 and after (0.073) (0.071) (0.073) (0.083) (0.072) (0.074) (0.078) 
Constant 0.250 0.339 0.851 0.725 -0.298 0.855 0.700  
(0.566) (0.540) (0.597) (0.623) (0.562) (0.569) (0.621) 
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Appendix 3.A. The First Order Conditions 
 
This section sets up the optimization problem of a representative firm that chooses 
its labor supply and WWP to maximize its objective function. We use a random utility 
model to establish a functional relationship between program options, implementation 
reasons, and organizations’ characteristics. The objective function has a systematic utility 
(𝑉), and a random residual (e). The systematic utility is a function of profit ( ) and other 
utility components ( ) that are not profit related. 
 
( , )u V e    (3.A.1) 
 
 
We assumed that there are three reasons for WWP implementation (R) and two 
WWPs (x𝜖 { 1 2,x x }) that the firm can choose to implement to achieve its objectives. 
Reasons for WWP implementation are savings from health care and productivity- related 
costs (S), improving employee health (H), and improving employee morale (M). 1x  and 
2x represent the two unspecified WWPs that a firm can chose between. 
 
1 2
{ , , }
{ , }






The program choice is assumed to attain the reason for program implementation. 
















where S, H, M can be improved with the right program input x. 
The profit component is the difference between total revenue and total cost. Total 
revenue is calculated as price (p) times production (Y). Total cost is determined with cost 
function (C). 
 
pY C    (3.A.3) 
 
 
Production is the function of labor input (L). Labor is a function of employee 
health where better health increases labor productivity. 
 
( )Y f L  (3.A.4) 
 
 
( )L L H  (3.A.5) 
 
 
where 𝑓(. ) is increasing in 𝐿 at a decreasing rate. In addition, labor is a function of 
employee health where the productivity increases with better health inputs.  
Cost function includes labor cost, workers’ compensation claims, and program 
cost. Wages (w), health care benefits (b), and sick days (d) determine the labor cost. The 
labor cost is the sum of health care benefits (bwL), cost of lost days (absenteeism) (dwL), 
and cost of presenteeism ( wL ). If there is no productivity loss due to presenteeism, then 
 =1 and the cost is wL. If there is loss due to presenteeism, then  >1 and the cost is 
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wL . Worker’s compensation claims (comp) are the cost of work-related injuries. If any 
program is chosen given the reason for program implementation, represented by the 
indicator function (I(x|R)), then the cost function includes program costs ( xpc ). 
 




The utility components that are not profit related ( ) create a corporate 
citizenship value for organizations to achieve firm’s goals (Peredo and McLean, 2006). 
Employee health and employee morale both affect this component, which is the 
additional piece to the classical firm theory of profit maximizing objectives. Including 
this component helps us to identify different motivations of for-profit, not-for profit, and 
nonprofit companies. 
 
( , )H M   (3.A.7) 
 
 
Suppose that the objective function has the linear form with parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 
that are organization’s weight on profit and other utility components. An organization 
maximizes its utility with respect to labor input and WWP choices: 
 
1 2{ , }, 0




Plug equations (3.A.2) to (3.A.7) in to (3.A.8). Let ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x b x d x s x    . An 
organization maximizes its utility with respect to labor input and WWP choices. Note that 
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choice of wellness programs is discrete. Normalize market price of production to 1 (p=1). 
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The demand for wellness programs is derived using these first order conditions. 
Using implicit function theorem, we can analyze how the objectives for implementing 






















Appendix 3.B. Additional Tables 
 
 
Table 3.B1. Univariate Probit Results on Inexperienced Sample 
 
Companies with no experience in 















Improve employee  -0.273 0.099 0.236 -0.087 0.210 0.160 0.143 
health (0.262) (0.274) (0.254) (0.257) (0.256) (0.310) (0.262) 
Improve the health of -0.159 0.169 0.175 0.007 0.284 0.402 0.227 
spouses and dependents (0.293) (0.304) (0.286) (0.289) (0.288) (0.340) (0.293) 
Increase responsibility 0.042 0.607** 0.233 -0.032 0.248 0.325 0.253 
for managing personal health (0.271) (0.283) (0.265) (0.268) (0.267) (0.319) (0.272) 
Contain health care  0.171 0.512* 0.204 0.083 0.113 0.278 0.377 
costs (0.262) (0.274) (0.255) (0.258) (0.257) (0.310) (0.263) 
Produce ROI 0.005 0.413 0.199 -0.325 0.087 0.059 0.207  
(0.303) (0.314) (0.298) (0.304) (0.300) (0.361) (0.304) 
Reduce unnecessary  -0.299 -0.007 -0.237 -0.271 -0.266 -0.014 0.005 
medical care utilization (0.293) (0.305) (0.286) (0.290) (0.288) (0.349) (0.295) 
Improve performance or -0.421 0.054 -0.015 -0.219 -0.105 0.252 0.209 
Productivity or reduce absenteeism (0.302) (0.311) (0.292) (0.297) (0.294) (0.349) (0.299) 
Retention or employee -0.321 0.236 0.273 -0.156 0.022 0.057 0.436 
request (0.291) (0.300) (0.283) (0.285) (0.284) (0.343) (0.289) 
Improve employee  -0.281 0.159 0.133 -0.077 0.116 0.210 0.249 
morale (0.274) (0.285) (0.266) (0.269) (0.267) (0.322) (0.273) 
Industry: Services -0.052 -0.076 0.061 0.121 0.055 -0.105 0.079  
(0.088) (0.088) (0.087) (0.088) (0.087) (0.098) (0.087) 
Industry: Manufacturing -0.023 0.100 -0.103 0.394*** 0.113 0.150 -0.048  
(0.124) (0.124) (0.122) (0.124) (0.123) (0.132) (0.123) 
Small company -0.220** -0.342*** -0.226*** -0.562*** -0.372*** -0.130 -0.238***  
(0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.087) (0.088) (0.096) (0.086) 
The first year of entry 0.027 -0.045 -0.163** -0.074 -0.101 0.001 -0.052 
to the Checklist: 2011 and after (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.088) (0.079) 
Constant 0.196 -0.433 0.071 0.299 0.149 -1.120* -0.519  








Table 3.B1. Univariate Probit Results on Inexperienced Sample (Continued) 
 
Companies with no experience in 















Improve employee  -0.114 0.063 0.242 0.174 -0.017 -0.189 -0.037 
health (0.274) (0.294) (0.280) (0.255) (0.267) (0.264) (0.263) 
Improve the health of 0.205 0.318 0.490 0.275 0.035 0.113 0.218 
spouses and dependents (0.305) (0.325) (0.310) (0.287) (0.299) (0.295) (0.293) 
Increase responsibility 0.230 0.467 0.564* 0.305 -0.067 0.105 0.227 
for managing personal health (0.283) (0.303) (0.289) (0.266) (0.278) (0.273) (0.272) 
Contain health care  0.150 0.305 0.373 0.304 -0.118 0.022 0.094 
costs (0.274) (0.295) (0.280) (0.257) (0.268) (0.264) (0.263) 
Produce ROI -0.006 0.280 0.438 0.193 0.016 -0.090 0.164  
(0.321) (0.338) (0.320) (0.298) (0.310) (0.309) (0.305) 
Reduce unnecessary  -0.288 -0.002 -0.077 0.139 -0.287 -0.198 -0.140 
medical care utilization (0.314) (0.332) (0.316) (0.288) (0.304) (0.298) (0.296) 
Improve performance or 0.051 0.318 0.299 0.252 -0.126 -0.096 -0.009 
Productivity or reduce absenteeism (0.314) (0.334) (0.316) (0.295) (0.307) (0.304) (0.303) 
Retention or employee 0.157 0.356 0.320 0.083 -0.285 -0.001 0.097 
request (0.302) (0.323) (0.307) (0.283) (0.298) (0.293) (0.290) 
Improve employee  0.028 0.236 0.400 0.229 -0.089 -0.282 -0.044 
morale (0.286) (0.306) (0.290) (0.267) (0.279) (0.277) (0.274) 
Industry: Services -0.021 -0.002 0.005 -0.127 0.120 0.083 0.056  
(0.093) (0.095) (0.089) (0.086) (0.092) (0.091) (0.088) 
Industry: Manufacturing 0.101 -0.012 -0.072 0.548*** 0.684*** 0.006 0.066  
(0.129) (0.135) (0.126) (0.128) (0.124) (0.129) (0.125) 
Small company -0.110 -0.195** -0.203** -0.074 -0.139 -0.310*** -0.344***  
(0.092) (0.093) (0.088) (0.087) (0.089) (0.088) (0.087) 
The first year of entry -0.090 -0.016 -0.064 -0.135* -0.183** -0.135* -0.070 
to the Checklist: 2011 and after (0.084) (0.086) (0.081) (0.079) (0.082) (0.082) (0.080) 
Constant -0.576 -1.024* -0.879 -0.233 -0.280 -0.087 -0.186  
(0.542) (0.583) (0.554) (0.506) (0.529) (0.520) (0.519) 








Table 3.B2 Univariate Probit Results on 1-3-Year Experienced Sample 
 
Companies with 1-3-year experience 
















Improve employee  -0.208 0.095 0.271 -0.061 0.236 0.284 0.204 
health (0.414) (0.262) (0.265) (0.269) (0.254) (0.291) (0.272) 
Improve the health of 0.005 0.111 0.207 0.010 0.331 0.455 0.264 
spouses and dependents (0.434) (0.293) (0.299) (0.299) (0.290) (0.327) (0.305) 
Increase responsibility -0.059 0.590** 0.264 -0.005 0.310 0.410 0.344 
for managing personal health (0.418) (0.271) (0.277) (0.280) (0.266) (0.303) (0.283) 
Contain health care  0.218 0.478* 0.227 0.085 0.126 0.346 0.388 
costs (0.416) (0.261) (0.268) (0.272) (0.257) (0.293) (0.275) 
Produce ROI 0.167 0.368 0.170 -0.336 0.032 0.102 0.186  
(0.454) (0.305) (0.303) (0.313) (0.291) (0.339) (0.314) 
Reduce unnecessary  0.051 -0.013 -0.193 -0.254 -0.263 0.103 0.013 
medical care utilization (0.444) (0.290) (0.296) (0.303) (0.282) (0.327) (0.300) 
Improve performance or -0.324 0.002 0.044 -0.197 -0.085 0.340 0.224 
Productivity or reduce absenteeism (0.438) (0.302) (0.308) (0.315) (0.300) (0.340) (0.313) 
Retention or employee -0.094 0.193 0.348 -0.123 0.083 0.156 0.485 
request (0.439) (0.286) (0.296) (0.298) (0.282) (0.318) (0.301) 
Improve employee  -0.342 0.171 0.179 -0.049 0.161 0.292 0.341 
morale (0.425) (0.273) (0.277) (0.283) (0.269) (0.304) (0.283) 
Industry: Services -0.115 -0.080 0.018 0.083 0.012 -0.123 0.047  
(0.086) (0.089) (0.087) (0.088) (0.086) (0.095) (0.084) 
Industry: Manufacturing 0.111 0.092 -0.100 0.382*** 0.105 0.142 -0.053  
(0.124) (0.120) (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) (0.131) (0.118) 
Small company -0.274*** -0.343*** -0.205** -0.541*** -0.337*** -0.164* -0.213***  
(0.080) (0.086) (0.084) (0.086) (0.084) (0.092) (0.082) 
The first year of entry 0.017 -0.050 -0.130* -0.055 -0.062 -0.026 -0.045 
to the Checklist: 2011 and after (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.086) (0.076) 
Constant 1.001 -0.376 -0.025 0.260 0.056 -1.247** -0.613  
(0.823) (0.511) (0.526) (0.535) (0.504) (0.578) (0.539) 








Table 3.B2 Univariate Probit Results on 1-3-Year Experienced Sample (Continued) 
 
Companies with 1-3-year 
experience in wellness programs 















Improve employee  0.016 0.142 0.318 0.221 0.022 -0.140 -0.018 
health (0.280) (0.298) (0.275) (0.261) (0.271) (0.267) (0.277) 
Improve the health of 0.229 0.299 0.500* 0.279 0.015 0.094 0.173 
spouses and dependents (0.313) (0.332) (0.303) (0.292) (0.303) (0.298) (0.307) 
Increase responsibility 0.335 0.535* 0.644** 0.377 -0.021 0.171 0.267 
for managing personal health (0.293) (0.308) (0.284) (0.272) (0.282) (0.279) (0.287) 
Contain health care  0.211 0.355 0.423 0.342 -0.090 0.038 0.071 
costs (0.284) (0.298) (0.275) (0.263) (0.274) (0.269) (0.278) 
Produce ROI 0.030 0.217 0.433 0.200 -0.012 -0.141 0.094  
(0.322) (0.341) (0.315) (0.304) (0.317) (0.305) (0.312) 
Reduce unnecessary  -0.202 0.018 -0.075 0.132 -0.263 -0.206 -0.183 
medical care utilization (0.318) (0.330) (0.311) (0.289) (0.302) (0.300) (0.306) 
Improve performance or 0.112 0.322 0.293 0.266 -0.140 -0.094 -0.049 
Productivity or reduce absenteeism (0.329) (0.333) (0.317) (0.306) (0.320) (0.313) (0.315) 
Retention or employee 0.246 0.422 0.386 0.144 -0.254 0.045 0.107 
request (0.312) (0.323) (0.293) (0.286) (0.304) (0.294) (0.304) 
Improve employee  0.176 0.349 0.485* 0.285 -0.062 -0.201 -0.002 
morale (0.296) (0.309) (0.286) (0.274) (0.285) (0.284) (0.291) 
Industry: Services -0.024 -0.004 -0.006 -0.153* 0.121 0.053 0.021  
(0.091) (0.092) (0.089) (0.085) (0.092) (0.090) (0.087) 
Industry: Manufacturing 0.124 0.013 -0.054 0.518*** 0.680*** -0.008 0.057  
(0.126) (0.130) (0.124) (0.123) (0.123) (0.125) (0.122) 
Small company -0.115 -0.208** -0.199** -0.069 -0.126 -0.301*** -0.323***  
(0.087) (0.088) (0.085) (0.085) (0.089) (0.085) (0.084) 
The first year of entry -0.116 -0.047 -0.079 -0.104 -0.188** -0.143* -0.070 
to the Checklist: 2011 and after (0.081) (0.082) (0.079) (0.078) (0.081) (0.081) (0.078) 
Constant -0.733 -1.102 -0.984* -0.328 -0.344 -0.133 -0.178  
(0.558) (0.592) (0.541) (0.517) (0.538) (0.530) (0.549) 








Table 3.B3. Univariate Probit Results on More Than 3-Year Experienced Sample 
 
Companies with more than 3-
year experience in wellness 
















Improve employee  0.356 0.446 1.057*** 0.360 0.385 0.241 -0.603 
health (0.302) (0.332) (0.368) (0.332) (0.400) (0.300) (0.499) 
Improve the health of 0.721** 0.954*** 0.883** 0.857** 0.211 0.570* -0.424 
spouses and dependents (0.328) (0.365) (0.400) (0.358) (0.426) (0.316) (0.514) 
Increase responsibility 0.390 0.442 0.890** 0.467 0.130 0.255 -0.599 
for managing personal health (0.312) (0.341) (0.388) (0.341) (0.411) (0.306) (0.506) 
Contain health care  0.609** 0.414 0.652* 0.323 0.303 0.081 -0.644 
costs (0.306) (0.334) (0.368) (0.334) (0.406) (0.300) (0.501) 
Produce ROI 0.387 0.245 1.037* 0.388 0.056 -0.088 -0.720  
(0.371) (0.399) (0.554) (0.401) (0.492) (0.354) (0.548) 
Reduce unnecessary  0.440 0.573 0.488 0.357 -0.145 -0.040 -0.756 
medical care utilization (0.339) (0.376) (0.407) (0.364) (0.434) (0.327) (0.521) 
Improve performance or 0.156 0.215 0.508 0.488 0.102 0.504 -0.542 
Productivity or reduce absenteeism (0.345) (0.381) (0.441) (0.383) (0.464) (0.339) (0.543) 
Retention or employee 0.299 0.430 1.079** 0.407 0.051 0.097 -0.681 
request (0.332) (0.365) (0.446) (0.363) (0.439) (0.324) (0.523) 
Improve employee  -0.017 -0.008 0.491 0.166 0.294 0.047 -0.378 
morale (0.323) (0.351) (0.406) (0.352) (0.442) (0.320) (0.522) 
Industry: Services -0.046 0.007 -0.017 0.074 0.059 -0.059 0.137  
(0.090) (0.097) (0.142) (0.091) (0.125) (0.079) (0.098) 
Industry: Manufacturing 0.123 0.147 -0.198 0.361*** 0.271 0.066 0.003  
(0.126) (0.137) (0.174) (0.133) (0.187) (0.106) (0.128) 
Small company -0.198** -0.265*** -0.277** -0.534*** -0.339*** -0.156** -0.309***  
(0.082) (0.090) (0.129) (0.085) (0.118) (0.072) (0.089) 
The first year of entry -0.005 -0.004 -0.013 0.074 0.016 -0.122* -0.056 
to the Checklist: 2011 and after (0.082) (0.089) (0.127) (0.084) (0.116) (0.071) (0.088) 
Constant 0.090 0.320 0.258 0.249 1.168 -0.350 2.382**  
(0.597) (0.654) (0.715) (0.655) (0.791) (0.592) (0.995) 








Table 3.B3. Multivariate Probit Results on More Than 3-Year Experienced Sample (Continued) 
 
Companies with more than 3-year 
experience in wellness programs 















Improve employee  0.149 -0.141 -0.204 0.199 0.322 -0.219 0.234 
health (0.303) (0.302) (0.317) (0.342) (0.298) (0.336) (0.324) 
Improve the health of 0.421 0.187 -0.126 0.551 0.557* 0.085 0.639* 
spouses and dependents (0.319) (0.318) (0.334) (0.364) (0.314) (0.353) (0.348) 
Increase responsibility 0.292 0.036 -0.117 0.372 0.475 -0.079 0.197 
for managing personal health (0.310) (0.309) (0.324) (0.352) (0.305) (0.344) (0.331) 
Contain health care  0.048 -0.052 -0.180 0.138 0.224 -0.216 0.074 
costs (0.304) (0.304) (0.318) (0.345) (0.298) (0.338) (0.325) 
Produce ROI -0.282 -0.068 -0.333 0.103 0.179 -0.331 0.129  
(0.354) (0.356) (0.369) (0.404) (0.351) (0.389) (0.388) 
Reduce unnecessary  0.079 -0.324 -0.439 0.191 0.339 0.027 0.275 
medical care utilization (0.330) (0.329) (0.342) (0.375) (0.325) (0.366) (0.357) 
Improve performance or 0.280 0.100 -0.148 0.376 0.650* -0.059 0.084 
Productivity or reduce absenteeism (0.343) (0.342) (0.356) (0.393) (0.339) (0.376) (0.366) 
Retention or employee 0.141 0.010 -0.182 0.244 0.442 -0.066 0.052 
request (0.329) (0.328) (0.342) (0.376) (0.324) (0.362) (0.351) 
Improve employee  -0.110 -0.099 -0.155 0.146 0.214 -0.487 0.017 
morale (0.322) (0.323) (0.337) (0.365) (0.317) (0.355) (0.345) 
Industry: Services -0.078 0.015 0.026 -0.145 0.002 0.177** -0.222**  
(0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.092) (0.080) (0.084) (0.089) 
Industry: Manufacturing -0.001 -0.075 0.029 0.388*** 0.058 0.008 0.009  
(0.109) (0.107) (0.109) (0.142) (0.108) (0.111) (0.123) 
Small company -0.185** -0.421*** -0.318*** -0.153* -0.274*** -0.377*** -0.493***  
(0.074) (0.072) (0.074) (0.085) (0.073) (0.076) (0.081) 
The first year of entry -0.055 0.106 0.065 -0.323*** -0.030 0.083 -0.040 
to the Checklist: 2011 and after (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.085) (0.072) (0.076) (0.080) 
Constant 0.273 0.428 0.896 0.755 -0.283 0.958 0.765  
(0.598) (0.597) (0.627) (0.676) (0.587) (0.666) (0.639) 





RETURN ON INVESTMENT OF WORKPLACE WELLNESS: 
 




For nearly half a century, businesses have relied on workplace wellness programs 
(WWPs) to improve employees’ overall health and wellbeing, thereby reducing 
organizational costs such as health care costs, turnover cost, and productivity losses due 
to poor employee health (Cohen, 1985; Baicker et al., 2010; Neira, 2013). Business’s 
expectations have been supported by an extensive body of empirical research, suggesting 
that WWPs improve employee health by reducing modifiable risks, such as obesity, 
tobacco use, physical inactivity, high stress, high blood pressure, and high blood glucose 
(Baker et al., 2008; Goetzel and Ozminowski, 2008; Meenan et al., 2010; Henke et al., 
2011; Goetzel et al., 2012; Nyman et al., 2012; Goetzel et al., 2014; Musich et al., 2014; 
Widmer et al., 2014; Newman et al., 2015). Research has further linked these health 
improvements to decreased organizational costs associated with health care utilization, 
employee performance, and employee turnover (Baker et al., 2008; Goetzel and 
Ozminowski, 2008; Trogdon et al., 2009; Meenan et al., 2010; Yen et al., 2010; Henke et 
al., 2011; Nyman et al., 2012; Merrill et al., 2013; Musich et al., 2014; Barbosa et al., 
2015; Dement et al., 2015). As a result, WWPs are commonplace in large companies in 
the US and worldwide. 
 135 
In addition to the business community, WWPs are popular among governments 
and international health policy organizations as a public health tool. For example, the 
European Network for Workplace Health Promotion was launched in 1996 to increase the 
awareness of valuing and nurturing employees as well as to link WWPs with 
organizations’ corporate strategies (ENWHP, 1997; De Greef, M., & Van den Broek, K., 
2004). The World Health Organization engages governments, nongovernmental 
organizations, and the private sector to promote health using WWPs (Declaration, 1997). 
In the US, the federal government initiated the Prevention and Public Health Fund to 
strengthen public health via workplace wellness initiatives as part of the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) of 2010 (Anderko et al., 2012). The ACA uses WWPs as a part of national 
public health policy to deal with chronic illnesses by giving grants to small businesses to 
provide comprehensive WWPs (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010). 
Given public policy efforts worldwide that encourage private investment in WWPs, it is 
critical that we have a robust base of economic evaluation evidence supporting 
investment in WWPs. 
The WWP economic evaluation literature has primarily focused on providing 
estimates of the return on investment (ROI) of WWPs because financial savings are 
considered to be the primary determinant WWP adoption by businesses (Hunnicutt and 
Leffelman, 2007; Meenan et al., 2010; Horwitz, Kelly, and Dinardo, 2013, Spence, 
2015). Many studies find that WWPs are associated with positive ROI through reduced 
organizational costs associated with health care utilization, employee turnover, and 
productivity (Baker et al., 2008; Trogdon et al., 2009; Baicker et al., 2010; Yen et al., 
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2010; Henke et al., 2011; Merrill et al., 2013; Goetzel et al., 2014; Dement et al., 2015). 
However, these findings on the ROI of WWPs are controversial. A growing number of 
studies show no indication that WWPs save money (Meenan et al., 2010; Horwitz et al., 
2013; Lewis and Khanna, 2013; Lewis et al., 2014). Furthermore, WWP ROI research is 
often criticized for methodological flaws in the study design, such as randomization 
problems resulting from legal and practical issues, measurement inconsistencies such as 
different formulations of ROI, and improper statistical analysis such as a lack of 
statistical inference information on the ROI estimate (Lewis and Khanna, 2013, 2014; 
Lewis, Khanna, and Montrose, 2014). Emphasizing the importance of these criticisms, a 
systematic review on WWP ROI found that studies with higher methodological rigor had 
lower ROI estimates (Baxter, 2014). 
In this study, we evaluate a WWP that was implemented by the Well-Spring 
Retirement Community in Greensboro, North Carolina. With approximately 300 
employees, Well-Spring is a nonprofit organization meeting the US Small Business 
Administration’s definition of a small business in Title 13, Code of Federal Regulation, 
part 121. Thus, our evaluation of the Well-Spring WWP is one of the first to be done of a 
small, nonprofit company. Beyond estimating the ROI of WWP in a small business, this 
paper contributes to the WWP ROI literature by presenting confidence intervals for our 
ROI estimates to allow for statistical inference. In addition to presenting an overall 
estimate of ROI, we estimate the effect of the WWP on turnover, employee injuries, lost 
employee labor days due to injury, and total organizational costs. We used the difference-
in-differences method to address biases resulting from self-selection into program 
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participation. Findings show that WWP participants had significantly fewer lost labor 
days and lower organizational costs outcomes compared to non-participants. Overall, the 
financial savings from the WWP were higher than the program implementation costs, 
resulting in a statistically insignificant ROI of 0.59. However, the point estimate was not 
significant because of large confidence intervals. 
Well-Spring’s Wellness Program 
Well-Spring, a nonprofit organization started in 1993, provides services 
addressing the physical, emotional, and spiritual needs of the elderly (Well-Spring 
Retirement Community Employee Manual, 2014). The main goals of the organization are 
to provide high and consistent quality services to its residents and maintain a safe and 
positive work environment for its employees. To accomplish its goals, Well-Spring has 
launched a series of annual WWPs to inform employees about healthy lifestyles and 
motivate them to engage in healthier behavior. 
This study evaluates the impact of Well-Spring’s “Just10” program that took 
place from February 3, 2014 through March 17, 2014. All employees were eligible to 
participate, but participation and completion were voluntary. The program taught 
employees how small commitments could yield large payoffs, such as an improved 
energy level and physical flexibility and mobility. The Just10 program was structured as 
a series of three challenges: losing ten pounds (lbs.), exercising ten minutes every day, 
and walking or running ten miles every week. Participants in the challenges were 
required to fill out activity logs provided by the Aquatic and Fitness Center Coordinator. 
Participants received $100 if they completed one or two challenges and received $300 if 
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they completed all three challenges. To record participant progress, the lose ten lbs. group 
was weighed before and after the program by the coordinator. Also, the exercise groups 
had to turn in activity logs that recorded the distance or the time of exercise to calculate 
how far they had walked or run and how long they had exercised. Employees with the 
highest percentage of weight loss in the lose ten lbs. group, and the most days of exercise 
and the most miles completed in the exercise groups won the cash rewards. 
The Logic Model 
In the program evaluation literature, a logic model is used to connect program 
resources to activities performed and outcomes achieved (Wholey, 1983; Rush and 
Ogborne, 1991). The aim is to identify components of the program and analyze how these 
components are associated. The logic model presented in Figure 4.1 illustrates the 
hypothesized causal relationship between Just10 program participation and the long-term 
health outcomes associated with the program. 
The inputs are the resources that are required to implement and operate the 
program. Inputs of the Just10 program included labor and non-labor costs, which were 
measured from the company’s perspective. The labor cost included the fitness center 
coordinator’s time spent on program preparation, employee training, monitoring and 
recording participants’ progress and results, as well as the maintenance and repair cost of 
the gym at the work site. The non-labor cost included incentives, which were cash 
rewards provided to motivate individuals to participate, and the space used for employee 
trainings. We provide a detailed explanation of program costs and their dollar values in 
the results section. 
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The intervention component of the logic model shows the information provided 
and the activities done during the Just10 program. Participants were encouraged to 
improve their physical health by consuming fewer daily calories, eating healthier foods, 
refraining from eating at least three hours before bedtime, and implementing planned and 
structured exercises. The program’s inputs, combined with intervention activities, were 
intended to raise employees’ awareness of how to lose weight and how to exercise with 
the purpose of creating a healthier workplace environment. 
The output component of the model is the direct consequence of the evaluated 
program. There are three main program outputs identified in this model: weight loss, 
regular exercise, and increased physical activity. The activities related to changing one’s 
diet were expected to result in weight loss. The activities related to physical activity were 
expected to result in more frequent and regular exercise in addition to weight loss. 
Proximal outcomes are the expected changes in the health risks and behavior 
caused by the program. The proximal outcomes are caused by either program outputs or 
intervention information and activities, even if the program outputs are not achieved. 
Because of these channels, proximal outcomes of decreased risk to physical health and 
increased awareness of heathier lifestyles were expected. Although the proximal outcome 
measures are important in the model, they are unobserved in this study because the data 
are not available. The employee biometrics data were available to the health insurance 
provider. However, we could not obtain the data due to the Health Insurance and Privacy 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, which regulates the security standards for 
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protecting health information. Thus, even though the logic model contains the proximal 
outcomes, we do not analyze them when evaluating the program. 
Distal outcomes are the long-term desired impacts of the wellness program. The 
distal outcomes are caused by either the proximal outcomes, or outputs even if changes in 
health risk or behavior are not achieved. In this study, the distal outcomes, which are the 
analysis outcomes, included decreased turnover rate, decreased number of work-related 
injuries, decreased lost labor days, and an aggregate outcome of decreased organizational 
cost through decreased turnover and injuries. 
To strengthen causal inference, the logic model needs to include external 
components such as confounders and moderators that could affect the causal relationship. 
The confounder factors are associated with both outcomes of interest and program 
participation. The confounders could affect the strength of association between Just10 
and the distal outcome. The moderator factors (interaction terms with program 
participation) impact the strength or the direction of the causal relationship between 
program participation and hypothesized outcomes. For this study, the confounder and 
moderator factors were age, gender, fulltime status, years of experience at Well-Spring, 
and department (health care or independent living). Older females among participants 
were possibly at a disadvantage when it came to losing weight for natural reasons such as 
hormones and metabolism (Sattler et al., 2018). Moreover, the older the person’s age, the 
lower his or her muscle mass, which might have been an obstacle to losing weight or 
exercising more for older participants (Institute of Medicine, 2003). The fulltime status 
and years of experience were expected to impact employee engagement in the program. 
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Fulltime and more experienced employees may be more likely to invest in wellness 
programs at work. The employee’s department may be related to the intensity of the 
employee’s job. For example, the health care department is subject to physically heavier 
workloads when compared to the independent living department, which could have 
impacted participation negatively. We provide detailed information on confounders, 
moderators, and outcomes in the data section. 
Data 
The Well-Spring administration provided individual-level, de-identified panel 
data on all employees for years 2013-2014. This study was reviewed and approved by the 
UNCG IRB. We used SAS statistical software (SAS version 9.4, Inc., Cary, NC) for the 
descriptive statistics and Stata Statistical Software (Release 14) for the outcome analysis. 
The dataset includes information on gender, birth year, fulltime status, department, dates 
of hire and termination, program participation and completion, dates of injury, injury-
related modified duty days (present at work but cannot perform normal job 
requirements),  injury-related lost work days (not present at work), hourly wages, hours 
of work per day, and overall cost of turnover based on the position. Date of injury, 
modified duty days, lost work days, hourly wage, and hours of work per day were only 
available for injured employees. Age, department indicators (health care and independent 
living), turnover rate, injury rate, lost labor days and organizational cost are derived using 
the dataset. 
To analyze the impacts of the program, turnover, injury, lost labor days, and 
organizational costs are used as analysis outcomes. Turnover is an indicator of employees 
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being terminated in a period. Cost of turnover includes fees for drug screens, background 
checks, registry checks, time paid for orientation, training, initial shadowing days on 
units, advertising, and lag time while positions are open. Injury is an indicator of 
employees being injured at work in a period. Lost labor days are the sum of modified 
duty days and lost work days that occurred due to injuries. Cost of injuries are calculated 
using hourly wage, hours of work per day, and lost labor days due to any injury. 
Organizational costs are calculated as the sum of injury and turnover costs. 
Periods are defined as follows: The “pre-program period” is between 2013 and the 
beginning of the Just10 program in February 3, 2014. The “program period” starts with 
the Just10 program and ends with the beginning of the 2015 wellness program, Triple 
Challenge, in February 2, 2015. Although the program period for evaluation was 12 
months, Just10 took place from February 3, 2014 through March 17, 2014. Periods were 
determined based on the start times of wellness programs to separate the outcomes 
impacted from one or two wellness programs. 
The study sample consists of 858 employee-periods. There are 116 participants in 
the Just10 program and 323 non-participants who were employed during the Just10 
program. In the pre-program period, 303 out of 323 non-participants and all participants 
were employed at Well-Spring. We did not include the period that starts with the Triple 
Challenge wellness program, because the outcomes would be affected by both Just10 and 
Triple Challenge programs. The timeline for the evaluation and the program periods are 
presented in Figure 4.2. 
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The descriptive statistics in Table 4.1 compare participants with non-participants 
for both pre-program and program periods. There were significantly more females and 
fulltime workers in the participants compared to non-participants for both periods. 
Additionally, program participants were significantly older than the non-participants for 
both periods. The mean age was 43 years old in the pre-program period and 44 years old 
in the program period for participants. The mean age was around 36 years old in both 
periods for non-participants. Participants were significantly older compared to 
nonparticipants in both periods. Around two-thirds of the employees were in the health 
care department, and around one-third were in the independent living department. Groups 
were not significantly different based on departments. Participants were significantly 
more experienced compared to nonparticipants. 
Table 4.1 also presents the descriptive statistics for analysis outcomes. Turnover 
rate is zero in the pre-program period due to how the study sample is defined. In the 
program period, turnover is significantly lower for the participant group. Injury rate, lost 
labor days, and organizational cost were lower for participants compared to non-
participants for both periods. 
Methods 
Econometric Model 
 Program (Treatment) Effect 
The economic evaluation literature of workplace wellness programs has 
commonly used the difference-in-differences (DID) method to deal with selection. The 
method eliminates individual-specific fixed effects and common time trends. The 
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individual-specific fixed effects are eliminated by differencing outcomes across periods. 
The common time shocks are eliminated by differencing outcome across participant and 
non-participant groups. 
In this analysis, we use the DID regression model to estimate a program effect for 
the outcomes of interest. Because the outcomes are nonlinear, identifying program causal 
effects on the outcome is different than linear models. The following subsections lay out 
the standard DID model, the DID model for nonlinear outcomes, and deriving and 
estimating program effects for all outcomes. 
Standard Difference in Differences Model 
A standard linear DID model for two-group and two-period set up is as follows 
(Athey and Imbens, 2006; Puhani, 2008): 
 








1 2it it it it itY G P X        (4.3) 
 
 
itY  is the outcome for employee 𝑖 observed at period t and values are independent 
across individuals. itP  is the indicator for program period. itG  is the indicator for 
participation group. it itP G  is the interaction term, and the indicator for participant group 
in the program period. 1itY  is the outcome when the program is present. 
0
itY  is the outcome 
when the program is absent. itX   is the vector of control variables. 𝑖𝑡.is the error term. 
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itY  is the realized outcome, whereas 
1
itY  and 
0
itY  are the outcomes for potential program 
status. To derive the realized outcome, plug (2) and (3) into (1): 
 
1 2it i it it it it it itY P G G P X          (4.4) 
 
 
In the linear DID model, average program effect is identified if the following 
assumptions hold (Blundell and Dias, 2009; Lechner, 2011): 
 
Assumption 1: ( | 1, , ) ( | 0, , ) ( )i i iE G P X E G P X E       and ( ) 0iE    
Assumption 2: ( | 1, , ) ( | 0, , ) ( )i i iE G P X E G P X E      and ( )iE    
Assumption 3: ( | 1, , ) ( | 0, , )i iE Y P G X E Y P G X    
( | 1, ) ( | 0, )i iE Y P X E Y P X     
 
 
The first assumption implies that the error term of the linear model is independent 
in the conditional mean. Because the error term is uncorrelated with observable and 
unobservable determinants of participation decision, there is no selection on the 
observables and the unobservables. The second assumption implies that the program 
effect ( ) is independent of participant group, so there is no selection into the program. 
The third assumption implies that if there was no program, both groups would have 
experienced the same time trends (common time trends assumption). The average 
program effect (average treatment effect - ATE),  , is calculated as the cross differences 





( ) ( | 1, 1, ) ( | 1, 0, )
( | 0, 1, ) ( | 0, 0, )
ATE E E Y G P X E Y G P X
E Y G P X E Y G P X
 

      





The program effect might be different across individuals. In that case, 
Assumption 2 is violated and ( | 1, , ) ( | 0, , )E Y G P X E Y G P X   . Then, the standard 
DID estimator gives the average program effect for participants (Average treatment effect 
on treated - ATT) (Athey and Imbens, 2006). 
Difference in Differences in Nonlinear Models 
Outcomes of interests are nonlinear variables in the analysis. Thus, consider the 
following nonlinear form of equations (4.2) and (4.3): 
 
1




1 2( )it it it it itY F G P X        (4.7) 
 
 
where 1itY  is nonlinear outcome variable under the program, and F(.) is a nonlinear 
transformation function. 0itY  is the unobserved counterfactual outcome but modeled as 
equation (4.7). This specification keeps the linear index structure of standard DID model, 
but it has a nonlinear link function, F(.) .The program effect cannot be calculated as the 
cross differences as in equation (4.5) because of nonlinearity. Instead the ATT is as 
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Equation (4.8) shows that we can still focus on the coefficient of the interaction 
term as program effect in the nonlinear specification because ATT is zero if and only if 
  is zero. The program effect is the incremental effect of the coefficient of the 
interaction term,  . 
For nonlinear outcomes, additional assumptions are needed for identification of 
the ATT. The outcome function is assumed to be strictly monotone in  , given period t 
and itX . Strict monotonicity means higher unobservables correspond to strictly higher 
outcome assuming the unobservables are related to better health and higher ability levels. 
In addition, outcomes do not directly depend on the program participation, where 
outcome of an observation in the absence of the program also satisfies the functional 
form F(.). Under these assumptions, the sign of   is the sign of the program effect. 
However, the coefficients do not show the magnitudes of the program effect due to 
nonlinearity (Athey and Imbens, 2006; Puhani, 2008). 
Empirical Model 
We estimate the following nonlinear outcome equation: 
 
1 2( 10 10 )it it it it it it itY F period just just period X          (4.9) 
 
 
In the nonlinear form,   is not the cross differences as in the linear DID model. 
Although the coefficient of the interaction term is not the program effect itself in the 
 148 
nonlinear case, we can still use interaction term for interpretations because the average 
program effect on participants only exists when 0  as shown in equation (4.8). We use 
the marginal effects to interpret the effect of the interaction term on the nonlinear 
outcome 
Model Specification 
When the groups are not randomized, participants are likely to be systematically 
different from non-participants with their (1) observed characteristics, such as age and 
gender, (2) unobserved characteristics, such as genetical factors and health history, and 
(3) expected benefits from the wellness program that drives motivation. The DID 
approach controls for individual-specific effects and common time trends. In addition, we 
controlled for various confounders and moderators listed in the logic model as age, 
gender, fulltime status, years of experience at Well-Spring, and health care department. 
The first specification includes interaction term of program participation and 
program period indicators ( 10it itperiod just ), Just10 participation ( 10itjust ), and period 
indicators ( itperiod ). This estimation deals with the selection due to individual and time-
specific effects. The second specification includes confounders ( itX ) as well as 
interaction term, Just10 participation, and period indicators. This estimation deals with 
selection due to observed characteristics as well as individual and time-specific effects. 
The third specification includes moderators ( 10it it itperiod just X ), and confounders as 
well as interaction term, Just10 participation, and period indicators. This estimation deals 
with selection due to observed characteristics as well as individual and time-specific 
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effects. Furthermore, moderators, which are the interaction terms of confounders with
10it itperiod just , indicates the differences in effects for age, gender, fulltime status, 
health care department, and experience groups. A joint test on moderators was performed 
to see whether there were any significant differences in these groups. 
We estimate equation (4.9) for the analysis outcomes of turnover, injury, lost 
labor days, and organizational costs using the specifications explained above. Estimation 
methods are explained in the following subsections. 
Turnover 
Turnover ( iturnover ) is the binary outcome that takes on a value of one if 
employees are terminated, and zero otherwise. We estimate the outcome using the logit 
model. The estimators are driven using maximum likelihood estimator. The log 
likelihood function is 
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where ip  is the predicted probabilities and ( )iW  is the cumulative density function 
with 0 ( ) 1iW  . iW  is the (row) vector of covariates 
[ 10 , , 10 , ]it it it it itperiod just period just X  and  is the corresponding (column) vector of 
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parameters '1 2[ ]    . The first order conditions for the logit maximum likelihood 


















Details for the first order conditions are provided in the Appendix 4.A. The 
marginal effect for the thj  regressor is 
 













Equation (4.13) shows the change in the conditional mean of turnover when the 
thj  regressor change by one unit. 
Injury 
Injury ( iinjury ) is the binary outcome that takes on a value of one if employees 
are injured, and zero otherwise. We estimate the outcome using the logit model with the 
same procedure as in turnover estimations. The estimators are driven using MLE. The log 
likelihood function is 
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where ip  is the predicted probabilities and ( )iW  is the cumulative density function 
with 0 ( ) 1iW  . iW  is the (row) vector of covariates 
[ 10 , , 10 , ]it it it it itperiod just period just X  and  is the corresponding (column) vector of 
parameters '1 2[ ]    . The first order conditions for the logit maximum likelihood 


















Details for the first order conditions are provided in the Appendix 4.A. The 
marginal effect for the thj  regressor is 
 













Equation (4.17) shows the change in the conditional mean of injury when the thj  
regressor change by one unit. 
Lost Labor Days 
Lost labor days ( ilostdays ) is a count variable that takes non-negative values. We 
estimate the outcome using the Poisson model. The estimators are driven using MLE. 
The log likelihood function is 
 
1
ln ( ) [ ln( ) ln( !)]
N
i i i ii
L lostdays lostdays  

    (4.18) 
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where i >0 is the expected value or average of ilostdays . The average i  may depend 
on the values of the covariates, iW . We follow a conventional approach in Poisson 
modeling and set exp( )i iW   (Woolridge, 2010). iW  is the (row) vector of covariates 
[ 10 , , 10 , ]it it it it itperiod just period just X  and  is the corresponding (column) vector of 



















Details for the likelihood function first order conditions are provided in the 
Appendix 4.A. The marginal effect for the thj  regressor is 
 













Equation (4.19) shows the changes in the conditional mean of lost duty days when 
the regressor change by one unit. 
Even though there are many zeros in the data for this variable, we do not need to 
model excess zeros because we know that lost labor days are positive only if there is an 
injury. Injury is the zero-inflation process for the count process of lost labor days. Thus, 
we estimate lost labor days outcome conditional on injury. 
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Organizational Costs 
Organizational cost ( icost ) is a continuous variable that takes nonnegative values. 
Cost could be zero because there is no injury and no turnover. Cost could also be zero if 
there is no turnover but there is an injury without lost labor days due to injuries. Because 
most employees remain with Well-Spring and do not have an injury, the distribution of 
organizational costs has a point mass at zero. We estimate the outcome using two-part 
model that deals with the point mass at zero and permits zeros and non-zeros to be 
generated by different densities. The estimators are driven using MLE. The first part 
models the probability of a zero and estimated using the logit model. The second part 
models the outcome conditional on being positive and estimated using generalized linear 
model (GLM). The log-likelihood function is 
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where I(A) is indicator function, equal to 1 if A is true, and 0 otherwise. The first part has 
the cumulative distribution function of logit model, (.) , and the second part has gamma 
distribution with log link function, (.)g . Details for the likelihood function and first order 
conditions are provided in the Appendix 4.A. The marginal effect of the second part 
GLM estimations for the thj  regressor is (Frondel and Vance, 2012): 
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We used a generalized linear model (GLM) with log link and gamma distribution 
to accommodate the heavy tail (positive skew) in the data. We chose GLM over ordinary 
least squares with log-scale because GLM offers unbiased estimates but might result in a 
loss of efficiency when errors are heteroscedastic (Belotti et al, 2015, Manning and 
Mullahy, 2001; Buntin and Zaslavsky, 2004). 
Return on Investment 
ROI was measured as the ratio of net benefit (the difference between benefit and 
cost) to cost, which had a threshold for positive ROI of zero. Savings from organizational 
costs were the benefit component and the program costs were the cost component. To 
calculate ROI, separate regressions of organizational costs and program costs were 
estimated. 
Benefit was the marginal effect on the interaction term from the two-part model 
explained above. We are interested in overall ROI for the company. Thus, we only 
considered the confounders as control variables but not the moderators when we 
estimated the organizational cost for the ROI. Cost was the coefficient on the program 
participation repressor from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Program costs were 
regressed only in the program participation. In the benefit estimation, the negative sign of 
the marginal effect means the organization saved money from program participation in 
the program period. If the sign of the marginal effect is positive, it means the 
organization lost money from program participation in the program period. Therefore, 
when calculating ROI, we use (( ) )benefit cost cost   formula. 
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ROI is formulated as a ratio; therefore, statistical precision information around 
ROI cannot be estimated. We used the nonparametric bootstrapping method to calculate 
confidence intervals around ROI. Bootstrapping provides ways of estimating confidence 
intervals and other measures of statistical precision by building data of replicated 
estimations. Organizational and program costs were estimated for each bootstrap 
replicate, resulting in an estimate of the ROI for each replicate. We regressed program 
costs instead of just using the average program cost because it was necessary to estimate 
ROI for each bootstrap replicate. 
The nonparametric bootstrap method makes no assumption on distribution of the 
original data, which is advantageous when the sample size is small. Let 

 be the 
regressed value that is calculated using the original data. Let 𝛿𝑏 be the values that is 
calculated from thb  bootstrap sample where 1,2,...,b B  denotes the bootstrap sample. 
We used bias-corrected confidence intervals within the nonparametric bootstrapping 
process because it yields better result in case the statistics are biased. The bias-corrected 
95% confidence interval is (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010; Hamilton, 1991) 
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where #{ }b 
 
  is the number of elements of the bootstrap sample distribution that are 
less than or equal to the observed sample distribution, and (.)  is the cumulative density 
distribution of standard normal variable. 
Results 
Program and Organizational Costs 
Program costs, which are measured from the perspective of Well-Spring, are the 
inputs related to implementing the Just10 program. The units of measurement, unit costs 
and the total cost in 2015 dollars are presented in Table 4.2. Program costs are calculated 
using economic costing which includes opportunity costs of labor and space used during 
Just10 as well as the accounting cost of cash prizes. Labor costs include the fitness 
coordinator’s hours and cost of maintenance and repair of the gym at the worksite. The 
fitness coordinator spent 4 hours per week (16 hours per month on average) working for 
the program. The hourly wage of the fitness coordinator was $17.52. Cost of the gym 
maintenance and repair was $11.42 per user per month. Total number of users was 123 
including 102 residents and 21 employees. The total labor cost for the entire one and half 
months of the program was $780.21. 
Non-labor costs contain the space used to train employees and prizes provided 
upon completion of the program. The fitness coordinator used the conference room at 
Well-Spring for the trainings. The opportunity cost of not renting the space is the fixed 
rental fee for a half-day, which was $395. Prizes were provided based on the number of 
completed challenges. Participants who completed less than three challenges won $100 
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and participants who completed all three challenges won $300. There were 40 
participants who received $100 and 34 participants who received $300. Total non-labor 
cost of the program was $14,612. Overall, the program cost Well-Spring $15,392, or 
$132.69 per participant, to implement. 
Organizational cost includes monetized values of employee and workplace 
outcomes improved by the Just10 program, such as costs of injury and turnover. Cost of 
workplace injuries are calculated by multiplying lost labor days, hours of work per day, 
and hourly wage. Terminated employees were assigned a turnover cost calculated from 
the midpoint of the following cost ranges based on their position: wait staff cost ranges 
from $0 to $500, in line staff cost ranges from $2,000 to $4,000, staff in professional or 
skilled positions cost ranges from $3,000 to $8,000, and some department managers cost 
ranges from $7,000 to $50,000. Wait stuff could include voluntary interns which resulted 
in zero turnover cost to Well-Spring when they completed their internship and left. The 
organizational costs are used in the ROI analysis and the program costs are used in the 
ROI analyses. All cost measures are adjusted to 2015 US dollars using the Consumer 
Price Index from Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Outcome Analysis 
We employ logit models to estimate turnover and injury outcomes, a Poisson 
model to estimate the lost labor days, and two-part model to estimate the organizational 
cost with three same specifications of no control, control for confounders, and control for 
both confounders and moderators. All models are estimated with cluster-robust standard 
errors. Confounders include age, experience at Well-Spring, and indicators for female, 
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fulltime, and health care departments. Although the participant and nonparticipant groups 
are not systematically different by the department, we control for the department because 
we expect it to impact the outcomes as discussed earlier. Moderators include interactions 
of Just10 participation and program period with age, female, fulltime employment, health 
care department, and Well-Spring experience variables (three-way interaction terms). We 
tested whether the moderators that are included in the analysis are jointly significant. 
Turnover 
Table 4.3 presents coefficients for analysis sample and marginal effects for 
average program effect on participants from the regressions of turnover. Marginal effects 
were calculated as discrete change from the base level. Recall that there is no turnover in 
the pre-program, by definition. Therefore, when we estimated the DID specification, only 
program participation was included. Just10 participation in the program period 
significantly decreases the probabilities of turnover around 9 percentage point in 
specification (1) but has the opposite effect in specifications (2) and (3). The coefficient 
and marginal effect for the interaction effect are not significant except for the first model. 
Employees with fulltime status or more experience are less likely to be 
terminated. If an employee has fulltime status, turnover significantly decreases by 11-15 
percentage points at 1% level compared to a part time employee. If an employee has one 
or more years of experience at Well-Spring, turnover significantly decreases around 5-
6percentage points at 1% level. Moreover, if an employee works in the health care 
department, turnover significantly decreases around 5-9 percentage points at 10% level. 
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Even if moderators are jointly significant, they have no significant impact on the 
outcome. 
Injury 
Table 4.4 presents coefficients for analysis sample and marginal effects for 
average program effect on participants from the regressions of injury. Marginal effects 
were calculated as discrete change from the base level. Just10 participation in the 
program period significantly decreases the probabilities of injury by 2 percentage points 
in specifications (1) and (2), and 3.5 percentage points in specification (3). Because 
injury is a rare event, the standard errors are quite high, and the effect of the interaction 
term is not statistically significant. 
Specification (3) shows that moderators are jointly significant and have 
significant effect on the outcome at 1% level. The presence of significant moderators in 
column (3) indicated that variables are now conditional on values of the variables they 
are interacted. 
Injury is a rare event, which leads to underestimated probabilities and maximum 
likelihood estimates suffer from small-sample bias (King and Zeng, 2001). Although the 
coefficient of Just10 participation in the program period changes due to three-way 
interactions, listed above, high magnitude in the coefficient seems questionable. Injury 
being rare event and three-way interaction terms together contribute to a large bias for the 
coefficient of Just10 participation in the program period. 
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Lost Labor Days 
Table 4.5 presents coefficients and marginal effects for the analysis sample from 
the regressions of lost labor days. Marginal effects were calculated as discrete change 
from the base level. The regressions were run conditional on having an injury. Thus, the 
sample size in the regressions were very small which greatly impacted the statistical 
significance. Participating in Just10 in the program period decreases the number lost 
labor days in all specifications around 55 days. In specification (3), the moderators are 
omitted due to collinearity. The marginal effect of participating in Just10 in the program 
period is not estimable. 
When an injury occurs, lost labor days significantly increase as age goes up. 
Similarly, employees with fulltime status has significantly higher lost labor days when an 
injury occurs. Employees with more experience have less lost labor days after an injury. 
Most of the coefficients were significant because we only estimate the outcome using the 
injured sample (22 observations). Marginal effects were significantly high in magnitude 
due to the same reason. 
The marginal effect on Just10 participation in the program period is high in 
magnitude. This is due to lost labor days is being rare event and having extreme outliers. 
We ran the regression on only injured sample, which included 22 observations with mean 
54 days lost, minimum 0 days lost, and maximum 554 days lost due to injuries. Although, 
estimates might suffer from inflated effects, bias in maximum likelihood estimations, and 
low statistical power, the marginal effects are actually close to sample mean. 
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Organizational Costs 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present coefficients from the first and second part GLM 
regressions for analysis sample and marginal effects for average program effect on 
participants from the organizational cost regressions. The method requires 
retransformation of log organizational costs into organizational costs. Thus, we used 
marginal effects when we interpreted the significance and the magnitudes for the right-
hand side variables. Marginal effects were calculated as discrete change from the base 
level. The logit estimations show that participating in Just10 in the program period 
decreases the probability of having positive organizational costs. The second part shows 
that, conditional on having organizational costs, participating in Just10 in the program 
period slightly increased the organizational costs. After the retransformation, marginal 
effects show that participation in the program period decreased the organizational costs in 
specification (2) and (3) but increased in specification (1). The program effect was not 
significant in any specification. 
Organization costs per employee goes up significantly at 10% level as age of 
employee increases. Female employees and employees with higher experience have 
significantly lower organizational costs. Employees in health care department have 
significantly higher organizational costs. 
ROI Estimation 
To calculate ROI, we estimated the regressions of organizational and program 
costs. We did not apply any discounting because all costs accrued within the year so there 
is no need to account for the changing value of the dollar over time. To estimate 
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organizational cost, we used a two-part model where the first part is a logit model on 
probability of organizational costs being positive and the second part is GLM with log 
link and gamma distribution. The regressions are provided in tables 4.6 and 4.7. To 
estimate the average program cost, we used the OLS model with only Just10 
participation. The estimations are presented in Table 4.8. 
ROI is measured as the difference between organizational costs and program 
costs, divided by the effect on program cost. Details on ROI calculation is provided in the 
methods section. The 95% confidence interval, which was the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of 
the distribution around the organizational costs, program costs, and ROI were estimated 
using a nonparametric bootstrapping with 1000 replications. The estimated organization 
cost is -$311.004 which is the program benefits with a confidence interval of [-1595.915, 
11636.34]. The estimated program cost is $132.69 with a confidence interval of [112.957, 
156.101]. Then the ROI is [(-(-$311.004)-$132.69)/ $132.69] = 1.344with the bias-
corrected confidence interval [-13.271, 84.145]. The wide range of confidence intervals 
in ROI is due to high variability in organizational cost. Although Well-Spring saved 
$2.344 for every $1 dollar of program investment, the wide range of confidence intervals 
for benefits, and therefore ROI reduce the precision of the ROI. 
Sensitivity Analysis for ROI Estimates 
We calculated the organizational cost using the sum of turnover and injury costs. 
We used midpoint of turnover cost ranges. In the sensitivity analysis, minimum and 
maximum point of turnover cost ranges were included in the organizational costs, 
respectively. Tables 4.9 and 4.10 presents the results. When organizational costs include 
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minimum of turnover cost, then ROI is (-$1.836) with the bias-corrected confidence 
interval [-5.960, 32.253] and it means Well-Spring lost $0.836 for every $1 dollar of 
program investment. When organizational costs include maximum of turnover cost, ROI 
is (-$0.989) with the bias-corrected confidence interval [-17.425, 84.844] and it means 
Well-Spring saved only $0.011 for every $1 dollar of program investment. The wide 
range of confidence intervals for benefits, and therefore ROI reduce the precision of the 
ROI in sensitivity analysis as well. 
ROI estimations are sensitive to turnover costs because the difference between 
minimum and maximum turnover cost increases as the position of the employee ranks 
higher. For example, this difference is $500 for the wait stuff position, where as it is 
$43000 for the department manager position. 
Discussion 
The economic evaluation literature of WWP has been criticized because of its 
lack of significant cost savings or positive ROI and issues with the choice of analytic 
methods to estimate outcomes. In addition, ROI of workplace wellness programs were 
usually evaluated in large companies which does not represent an average organization 
size. The systematic review chapter of this dissertation showed that there were only four 
studies that reported confidence intervals around ROI for its significance, seven studies 
that used proper analytic method based on outcome distributional properties, and three 
studies with ROI of workplace wellness programs in small companies. The literature 
needs independent research to fill this knowledge gap, which negatively impacts adopting 
WWPs, and provide reliable evidence. 
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The evaluation of WWP at Well-Spring presented the ROI of a multicomponent 
wellness program in a small nonprofit company. The main analysis accounted for 
differences in turnover, injury, lost labor days, and organizational costs. Turnover 
outcome was monetized using cost ranges provided by Well-Spring. Injury outcome was 
monetized using lost labor days, hours of work per day and hourly wages. We estimated 
the organizational costs savings of $210.342 per participant over a two-year period. The 
overall ROI was 0.585 (95% confidence interval, (-35.095, 14.103) or 58.5%, indicating 
that average organizational costs declined by $1.585 for every $1.00 spent on the Just10 
wellness program. The systematic review analysis showed that included articles had an 
average ROI of 0.67 for small companies (Maniscalco et al., 1999; Palumbo et al., 2013; 
Griffin et al., 2016). Although the ROI of Well-Spring was below the ROI average of 
systematic review, Well-Spring did indeed save money from the wellness program. 
However, the large confidence interval around the ROI estimate, estimated using a 
bootstrapping method, showed that the results are not precise. 
Five main limitations need to be pointed out. First, the program participation in 
exercising groups was self-reported, which might be overstated by participants. 
Completions of exercising challenges were rewarded with cash prizes. Program costs 
might have gone up due to measurement error. Measurement errors in the explanatory 
variable due to self-reporting could lead to bias estimates (Gujarati, 2009). Second, the 
ROI finding may have been understated or overstated due to missing compensation 
claims data. At the time the data were provided, the compensation claims were not 
available to the company. Third, cost of turnover only varies by the employee position 
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not by individual-level which would impact the organizational cost when calculating 
ROI. Measurement errors in the dependent variables due to data observability issues 
produce unbiased estimates; however, the power of statistical tests is reduced due to 
larger variances (Gujarati, 2009). Fourth, despite the effort to reduce the selection bias 
using delivering DID specification, the estimation results may be biased due to 
heterogenous program effects. Fifth, injury and lost labor days outcomes are rare events 
which could also impact the significance and magnitude of the findings. Rare events lead 
to bias estimates (King and Zeng, 2001). Lost labor days and organizational costs had 
extreme outliers which impact the efficiency of the estimates due to heteroscedasticity. In 
a rare event case, the effect of extreme outliers on estimations could magnify. 
The systematic review chapter shows that the statistical inference information for 
ROI are mostly missing and large companies are overrepresented in the literature. In 
addition, articles on small companies had an average quality score of 7.4 where the 
overall average score of included articles were 11.5 out of 18. Well-Spring study 
contributes to the field by providing rigorous evidence on a small nonprofit company and 
presenting the confidence intervals around ROI estimate. This essay scores 15.5 out of 18 
when evaluated based on the quality rigor rubric provided in Chapter II. Although the 
observational design negatively impacted the score, this paper scored above the average 
of randomized studies, which was 14.2, included in the systematic review. Therefore, we 
can argue that the field can improve the study rigor even if more randomized study 
cannot be produced. This study can be generalized to a larger population of small 
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companies in terms of program evaluation methods. However, findings do not necessarily 
imply to WWPS in other small companies. 
The WELCOA chapter of this dissertation shows that there are misalignments in 
the economic evaluation literature of WWPs in terms of companies’ reasons for adoption 
and evaluated outcomes. Well-Spring study contributes to the field by providing rigorous 
evidence on a small nonprofit company, by aligning the objectives and evaluated 
outcomes, and by presenting the confidence intervals around ROI estimate. The 
contributions are expected to shift the understanding of why and how we should evaluate 



































  Pre-program period Program period 
  PJ10 NPJ10 Difference PJ10 NPJ10 Difference 
Age 42.862 35.716 -7.146*** 43.862 36.344 -7.518*** 
  (12.90) (16.06) (1.666)    (12.90) (15.92) (1.643)    
Female 0.897 0.762 -0.134*** 0.897 0.771 -0.126*** 
  (0.306) (0.426) (0.043)    (0.306) (0.421) (0.043)    
Fulltime 0.793 0.426 -0.367*** 0.793 0.415 -0.378*** 
  (0.407) (0.495) (0.052)    (0.407) (0.493) (0.051)    
Independent living 0.319 0.360  0.041    0.319 0.347  0.028    
  (0.468) (0.481) (0.052)    (0.468) (0.477) (0.051)    
Health care 0.681 0.640 -0.041    0.681 0.653 -0.028    
  (0.468) (0.481) (0.052)    (0.468) (0.477) (0.051)    
Well-Spring experience 8.899 6.373 -2.526*** 8.899 6.084 -2.815*** 
(years) (6.693) (5.433) (0.634)    (6.693) (5.390) (0.624)    
Turnover rate 0.000 0.000  0.000    0.172 0.263  0.091**  
  (0) (0) (0.000)    (0.379) (0.441) (0.046)    
Injury rate 0.034 0.030 -0.005    0.009 0.025  0.016    
  (0.183) (0.170) (0.019)    (0.0928) (0.156) (0.015)    
Lost labor days 0.948 2.271  1.322    0.000 1.223  1.223    
  (6.416) (32.21) (3.015)    (0) (14.59) (1.355)    
Organizational cost  78.557 164.546 85.988    838.793 1150.236 311.443    
(2015$) (528.2) (2287.1) (214.654)    (1889.8) (2718.8) (273.547)    
Number of employees 116 303     116 323   
Notes: Mean coefficients; standard deviations are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 





Table 4.2. Cost of the Just10 Program 
 
Measure Unit Per Unit Price 





1. Labor cost 
    
  
    




per hour 17.52 16 280.32 
1.2. Cost of gym 
maintenance and equipment 
(monthly average) 
per employee 11.42 21 239.82 
Total labor cost per month 520.14 1.5 780.21 
2. Non-labor cost 
    
  
    
2.1. Prizes employee (less than 
three challenges) 
100.12 40 4,004.80 
  employee (three 
challenges) 
300.36 34 10,212.24 
2.2. Space (Well-Spring 
conference room) 
half day 395.02 1 395.02 
Total non-labor cost       14,612.06 
Total program cost 








Table 4.3. Estimation Results for Turnover 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Logit Logit Logit 
Just10 participation -0.539* 0.503 0.060 
  (0.277) (0.349) (1.866) 
 [-0.091]** [0.047] [0.007] 
Age  -0.001 0.009 
   (0.011) (0.012) 
  [-0.000] [0.001] 
Female  0.192 0.212 
   (0.364) (0.409) 
  [0.019] [0.023] 
Fulltime  -0.984*** -1.188*** 




Health care department  -0.504  -0.756** 
   (0.265) (0.300) 
  [-0.054]* [-0.088]** 
Well-Spring experience  -0.472*** -0.556*** 




Age*Interaction term   -0.040 
    (0.027) 
   [-0.004] 
Female*Interaction term   0.366 
   (1.022) 
   [0.038] 
Fulltime*Interaction term   0.973 
    (0.692) 
   [0.095] 
Health care department*Interaction term   0.934 
   (0.749) 
   [0.095] 
Experience*Interaction term   0.267 
    (0.261) 
   [0.030] 
Constant -1.030*** -2.730*** -2.903*** 
  (0.127) (0.861) (0.943) 
Log pseudolikelihood -239.480 -170.485 -167.276 
Pseudo R-square 0.008 0.294 0.307 
Number of employee-period 439 439 439 
Number of employees 439 439 439 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Marginal effects for participant in the 
program period, which is the average treatment effect on treated, are in brackets. The sample 
for marginal effects is 116 participants. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Variable of 
interest is the program effect which is the Just10 participation. In pre-program period, 
turnover is zero because of the way the analysis sample was defined. Thus, interaction term 
and program period indicators are omitted. Age and Well-Spring experience are demeaned 
continuous variables. Periods are defined as follows: The pre-program period is between 
2013 and the beginning of the Just10 program. The program period starts with the Just10 




Table 4.4. Estimation Results for Injuries 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Logit Logit Logit 
Just10 participation*Program period -1.226 -1.230 -140.008*** 
(Interaction term) (1.230) (1.228) (7.056) 
 [-0.020] [-0.020] [-0.353]*** 
Just10 participation 0.154 -0.209 -0.212 
  (0.611) (0.695) (0.695) 
 [0.001] [-0.002] [-0.000] 
Program period -0.187 -0.177 -0.195 
  (0.493) (0.499) (0.510) 





















  [0.008] [0.000] 




















   [-0.000] 
Female*Interaction term   11.647*** 
   (1.364) 














   [0.000]*** 
Constant -3.486*** -4.554*** -4.628*** 
  (0.339) (0.658) (0.669) 
Log pseudolikelihood -101.148 -97.828 -91.594 
Pseudo R-square 0.011 0.044 0.105 
Number of employee-period 858 858 858 
Number of employees 439 439 439 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Marginal effects for participant in the 
program period, which is the average treatment effect on treated, are in brackets. The sample 
for marginal effects is 116 participants. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Variable of interest 
is the program effect which is the interaction term. Age and Well-Spring experience are 
demeaned continuous variables. Periods are defined as follows: The pre-program period is 
between 2013 and the beginning of the Just10 program. The program period starts with the 




Table 4.5. Estimation Results for Lost Labor Days 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Poisson Poisson Poisson 
Just10 participation*Program period -15.082*** -6.472 -6.472 
(Interaction term) (1.455) (4.336) (4.336) 
 [-55.033]** [-54.143]*** N/A 
Just10 participation -1.022 -1.682** -1.682** 
  (0.859) (0.847) (0.847) 
 [-40.419] [-61.966]** [-61.966]** 
Program period -0.437 0.211 0.211 
  (0.955) (0.569) (0.569) 





















  [51.474]* [51.474]* 




















   [0.000] 
Female*Interaction term   0.000 
   (.) 














   [0.000] 
Constant 4.337*** 2.828* 2.828* 
  (0.762) (1.453) (1.453) 
Log pseudolikelihood -1501.993 -773.777 -773.777 
Number of employee-period 22 22 22 
Number of employees 22 22 22 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Marginal effects are in brackets. * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Variable of interest is the program effect which is the 
interaction term. Age and Well-Spring experience are demeaned continuous variables. Periods 
are defined as follows: The pre-program period is between 2013 and the beginning of the Just10 
program. The program period starts with the Just10 program and ends with the beginning of the 





Table 4.6. The First Part Estimation Results for Organizational Cost 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Logit Logit Logit 
Just10 participation*Program period -1.203* -1.199* -2.407 
(Interaction term) (0.711) (0.728) (1.835) 
Just10 participation 0.570 1.299* 1.308* 
  (0.655) (0.720) (0.734) 
Program period 2.966*** 3.171*** 3.167*** 





































Female*Interaction term   0.502 







Health care department*Interaction term   0.548 







Constant -3.902*** -5.069*** -4.910*** 
  (0.413) (0.725) (0.771) 
Log pseudolikelihood -1424.739 -1347.113 -1340.799 
Pseudo R-square 858 858 858 
Number of employee-period 439 439 439 
Number of employees -1.203* -1.199* -2.407 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Marginal effects are in brackets. * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Variable of interest is the program effect which is the 
interaction term. Age and Well-Spring experience are demeaned continuous variables. Periods 
are defined as follows: The pre-program period is between 2013 and the beginning of the 
Just10 program. The program period starts with the Just10 program and ends with the 





Table 4.7. The Second Part Estimation Results for Organizational Cost 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  GLM GLM GLM 
Just10 participation*Program period 1.469* 0.570 0.603 
(Interaction term) (0.796) (0.852) (0.865) 
 [380.452] [-311.004] [-510.027] 
Just10 participation -1.294 -0.644 -0.440 
  (0.789) (0.776) (0.823) 
 [-1031.915] [491.313] [342.895] 
Program period -0.711 0.609 0.833 
  (0.697) (0.652) (0.654) 





















  [625.217] [654.841] 













  [-283.787]*** [-171.201]** 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Marginal effects for participant in the program 
period, which is the average treatment effect on treated, are in brackets. The sample for marginal effects is 
116 participants. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Variable of interest is the program effect which is the 
interaction term. Age and Well-Spring experience are demeaned continuous variables. Periods are defined 
as follows: The pre-program period is between 2013 and the beginning of the Just10 program. The program 






Table 4.7. The Second Part Estimation Results for Organizational Cost (Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 







   [-41.647]** 
Female*Interaction term   1.805*** 
   (0.396) 







   [-962.530] 
Health care department*Interaction term   -1.944*** 
   (0.318) 







   [31.298] 
Constant 9.025*** 7.385*** 6.969*** 
  (0.690) (0.704) (0.758) 
Log pseudolikelihood -292.246 -239.501 -238.278 
Pseudo R-square 0.163 0.314 0.317 
Number of employee-period 121 121 121 
Number of employees 117 117 117 
 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Marginal effects for participant in the program 
period, which is the average treatment effect on treated, are in brackets. The sample for marginal effects 
is 116 participants. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Variable of interest is the program effect which is 
the interaction term. Age and Well-Spring experience are demeaned continuous variables. Periods are 
defined as follows: The pre-program period is between 2013 and the beginning of the Just10 program. 
The program period starts with the Just10 program and ends with the beginning of the 2015 wellness 













Marginal cost estimate (per-
employee) 
-311.004 132.692*** 1.344 
Bias-corrected confidence 
intervals 
[-1595.915, 11636.34] [112.957, 156.101] [-13.271, 84.145] 
Number of employee-period 858 858 858 
Number of employees 439 439 439 
Notes: ROI = (-Benefit-Cost)/Cost. The negative sign shows that there were savings. Thus, when we 
calculated the ROI, we multiplied the coefficient with (-1). 
 
 







Marginal cost estimate (per-
employee) 
-110.902 132.692*** -1.836 
Bias-corrected confidence 
intervals 
[-622.486, 4491.694] [112.957, 156.101] [-5.960, 32.253] 
Number of employee-period 858 858 858 
Number of employees 439 439 439 
Notes: ROI = (-Benefit-Cost)/Cost. The negative sign shows that there were savings. Thus, when we 
calculated the ROI, we multiplied the coefficient with (-1). 
 
 







Marginal cost estimate (per-
employee) 
1.623 132.692*** -0.989 
Bias-corrected confidence 
intervals 
[-2151.462, 11295.52] [112.957, 156.101] [-17.425,84.844] 
Number of employee-period 858 858 858 
Number of employees 439 439 439 
Notes: ROI = (-Benefit-Cost)/Cost. The negative sign shows that there were savings. Thus, when we 
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Appendix 4.A. The First Order Conditions 
 
iW  is the (row) vector of covariates [ 10 , , 10 , ]it it it it itperiod just period just X  and 
 is the corresponding (column) vector of parameters
'
1 2[ ]    . 
4.A1. Turnover 
The first order conditions for predicted probabilities of turnover with respect to 
parameters are as follows: 
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where ip  is the predicted probabilities and ( )iW  is the cumulative density function 
with 0 ( ) 1iW  . The first order condition (4.A.4) shows that the raw residuals, 
( )i iturnover p , are orthogonal to regressors. 
4.A2. Injury 
The first order conditions for predicted probabilities of injury with respect to 
parameters are as follows: 
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where ip  is the predicted probabilities and ( )iW  is the cumulative density function 
with 0 ( ) 1iW  . The first order condition (4.A.8) shows that the raw residuals, 
( )i iinjury p , are orthogonal to regressors. 
4.A3. Lost Labor Days 
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The first order condition (A2.4) shows that the raw residuals, 
(exp( ) )i iW lostdays  , are orthogonal to regressors. 
4.A4. Organizational Costs 
The log-likelihood function for the two-part model is 
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where I(A) is indicator function, equal to 1 if A is true, and 0 otherwise. 
( 0) 1 ( 0)i iI cost I cost    , without loss of generality. 
( 0 | ) 1 ( 0 | )i i i iP cost x P cost x     without loss of generality, is the conditional 
probability for the first part and estimated using logit model. ( | 0, )i i if cost cost x  is the 
probability density function of the outcome, conditional on the outcome being positive in 
the second part, which has the gamma distribution ( ( )ih y ) with log link function ( ( )ig 
). 
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where y represents the outcome for simplification, ( ) ( 1)!k k    is the gamma function, 
and 2 2( )iV Y    is the variance of the outcome. Let ( 0)iI cost  =1 . The log-likelihood 
function can be written as: 
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The idea of promoting health to prevent chronic illnesses has been prevalent for a 
long time. Take Fielding 1984 and Edington 2014 as examples. These papers are thirty 
years apart, yet each paper proposes the same strategy: implementing WWPs as solutions 
to promoting health by targeting the health behaviors of their employees. The 
consequences of chronic illnesses impact all the stakeholders with treatment cost, 
income, and productivity losses. The question is whether WWPs achieve their public and 
private objectives. Despite increasing governmental support for WWP provisions, the 
effectiveness of WWPs in promoting health continues to be questioned. 
The main objective of this dissertation is to offer new approaches for the 
successful implementation and assessment of WWPs in order to provide rigorous 
evaluations on the effectiveness of WWPs. The research questions, methods, and findings 
of this study have significant contributions to the field by answering the following 
questions: 
1. Is research asking the right question when incorporating the value 
propositions for stakeholders? 
2. Can a common impact of WWPs be identified to justify the use of WWPs as 
robust policy tools in public health? 
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Our findings show that the narrow focus of economic evaluation literature 
excludes value propositions of employees and the government. A lack of reliable findings 
for the program impacts is the result of only focusing on the employers’ perspective for 
outcome evaluations and ignoring the program objectives other than ROI. In addition, 
there is a potential lack of association between objectives for WWP implementation and 
program choice where health insurance companies and program vendors might determine 
the program trends. Expected program outcomes may not be attained due to missing 
connections between organizational objectives and program choice, as well as the 
missing alignments of value propositions. 
Additionally, our findings present that WWPs differ based on the needs of 
workplaces, objectives of employers, and other workplace characteristics, such as 
industry and size. Thus, WWPs are unique to their workplaces and each evaluation can be 
considered as a single observation. The literature allows us to derive a conclusion mostly 
for whether large companies have positive ROI. Moreover, we cannot validate whether 
the evaluated WWPs significantly affect the outcome due to missing statistical inference 
information. 
Current literature does not provide enough reliable evaluations on the 
effectiveness of WWPs. The field needs rigorous evaluations so that we can discuss the 
effectiveness of WWPs at the public policy level. The field needs further research that 
offers evidence on aligning private market incentives for WWP implementation that 
would lead to efficient use of resources for both public and private perspectives. 
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Many evaluation studies informed us about possible limitations such as selection 
bias and data issues. The field is aware of its blind spots, yet fails to deliver solutions to 
those problems. The first essay, the systematic review, contributes to the field by 
providing methods that can advance study rigor. Self-selection into program participation 
that causes positive bias for the program effects is one of the major critiques of WWP 
evaluations. Even if randomization is the golden standard as the means to remove 
selection bias, conducting randomized studies is not always feasible for WWPs, 
especially if new regulations require these programs to be available to all employees and 
participation is often volunteered. The systematic review proves that the field can 
improve study quality even if more randomized studies cannot be conducted. The review 
shows the need for more independent study, more studies in small companies, and 
improvements in reporting quality and analysis methods. 
The articles included in the systematic review provides the objectives of the study 
but do not discuss the objectives of the organization for implementing WWPs. The 
second essay, the WELCOA study, verifies that ROI is not necessarily the main 
objective. ROI could be beneficial to look at the use of an organization’s financial 
resources. Yet it cannot determine the success of the program if ROI is not the objective. 
In addition, the WELCOA study demonstrated that instead of organizational objectives, 
marketing trends in workplace wellness might have more influence over the decision-
making process. This behavior could prevent organizations from choosing the optimal 
programs. The systematic review and WELCOA studies both confirm the disconnection 
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between businesses and academia as well as the disconnection between organizational 
objective and program choice. 
The third essay, the Well-Spring study, evaluates a WWP in a small non-profit 
company to respond to some of the issues raised in the first and second essays. The Well-
Spring study demonstrates how to improve the methodological quality of an 
observational study with better reporting and analysis methods. The findings show that a 
small company can produce positive ROI close to the average of large companies that 
was found in the systematic review. Also, the point estimate of ROI is positive, but not 
significant, which we cannot derive from the literature. The focus of the third essay is on 
ROI because of organizational preferences. The company wanted to see whether the 
program saved any money through reducing the costs of injuries and turnover. However, 
it is important to note that the Just10 program might not have been the optimal program 
for Well-Spring to achieve its goals. This essay cannot offer a solution for aligning 
organizational objectives and program choice. 
Not all WWPs are well-designed and well-organized, which affects the 
evaluations. Thus, identifying best practice designs to assess organizational performance 
in implementing WWPs seems the right direction for progress. Practitioners and 
academicians came up with the idea of best practice designs for WWPs. Common 
benchmark domains are identified as key factors for success. Although economic 
evaluation literature does not reflect the diversity of program setting and implementation, 
benchmarks could provide an agreement on the key factors for successful WWP 
implementations. Best practice designs could provide a framework for concerns related to 
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the decision-making process and effectiveness of WWPs. The main reasons why 
evaluations cannot address diversity in program settings and implementation are the 
missing value propositions of stakeholders and similar relevant data. For example, 
WELCOA’s Well Workplace Checklist does a good job of bringing the major 
benchmarks together. The checklist provides vague information on the employers’ 
perspective. This information needs to be clear. In addition, information on employee-
facing measures and targeted outcomes should be included so we can connect both the 
organizational goal(s) and performance in implementing WWPs to the program success. 
This study contributes to the field by identifying missing alignments in value 
propositions. This is the first study which uses economic theory to model firm behavior 
when implementing WWPs. This novel approach is expected to shift why and how we 
should evaluate WWPs by incorporating organizational values. This study also 
contributes to the field by providing a rigorous evaluation of a small nonprofit company 
and sets an example of how to align company objectives for WWP implementation with 
evaluated outcomes to improve the reporting quality for reliable evidence. 
